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AFIT/GCO/ENG/11-16 
Abstract 
 
 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is a vital component to the 
protection of data as it traverses across networks.  From e-commerce websites to Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs), TLS protects massive amounts of private information, and 
protecting this data from Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks is imperative to keeping the 
information secure.  This thesis illustrates how an attacker can successfully perform a 
MitM attack against a TLS connection without alerting the user to his activities.  By 
deceiving the client machine into using a false certificate, an attacker takes away the only 
active defense mechanism a user has against a MitM.  The goal for this research is to 
determine if a time threshold exists that can indicate the presence of a MitM in this 
scenario.  An analysis of the completion times between TLS handshakes without a MitM, 
with a passive MitM, and with an active MitM is used to determine if this threshold is 
calculable.  Any conclusive findings supporting the existence of a timing baseline can be 
considered the first steps toward finding the value of the threshold and creating a second 
layer defense to actively protect against a MitM.   
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Conventions Used in This Paper 
 
 The terms client, server, user, and Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) are consistently 
used throughout this thesis.  The term client is used to refer to the machine that initiates a 
Transport Layer Security connection to a secure website.  The server refers to the 
machine that hosts the web server that the client is connecting to.  The term user indicates 
the person using the client machine.  This person is the one who connects to and requires 
information from the secure website.  The term Man-in-the-Middle or MitM refers to both 
the attacker and his machine.  The MitM is the one trying to glean information from the 
connection between the client and the server.  Two different adjectives are associated 
with the MitM throughout this report.  A passive MitM refers to when an attacker is 
acting as a proxy between the client and the server but is not making any changes to the 
packets.  An active MitM refers to when an attacker is not only acting as a proxy, but is 
manipulating the packets in order to obtain the session keys for the connection. 
. 
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DETECTING MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS AGAINST TRANSPORT LAYER 
SECURITY CONNECTIONS WITH TIMING ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is responsible for protecting nearly 
all secure web browsing on the Internet today.  From e-commerce websites to Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs), TLS protects private information exchanged across a network.  
This information includes, but is not limited to, passwords, bank account information, 
and personal identifiable information.  As the use and dependency of the Internet 
increases, so does the quantity of data that needs to be protected.  And while the TLS 
protocol is considered to be cryptographically secure, implementation and general user 
practices leave the protocol prone to vulnerabilities. 
The TLS protocol has many techniques that protect against a number of well 
known attacks such as the Man-in-the-Middle (MitM).  This attack is an eavesdropping 
method that allows an adversary to gather and potentially alter data transmitted across a 
network.  With the proper implementation and use of public key certificates, TLS 
prevents a MitM from obtaining any private data shared between a client and a server.  A 
public key certificate ensures that the client is communicating with a legitimate server 
and that only the server is able to decrypt data used to generate session keys.  These 
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session keys allow the two entities to communicate using encryption methods that 
prevent any outsider from acquiring information that he should not have access to.  Thus 
protecting the session keys is imperative to protecting any sensitive data.   
Currently a MitM has two options if he wants to garner the session keys for a 
particular TLS connection.  The first method is to obtain the server‟s private key in order 
to decrypt the data needed to create the session keys.  Decrypting this message without 
access to the server‟s private key is computationally infeasible, and attaining a server‟s 
private key is very difficult.  The second method a MitM can use to get the session keys 
is install his own server certificate that is trusted by the client.  The client encrypts the 
data used to create the session keys with the public key from the certificate it receives.  
With this certificate switch and a few other packet manipulations so that the connection is 
not aborted, a MitM can generate the session keys needed to read all the application data 
from the TLS connection. 
A client defends against this second method by verifying all certificates it 
receives.  When it is given an unauthenticated certificate, the client issues a warning to 
the user suggesting that the connection should be closed.  Creating a valid, fake 
certificate is not easy to accomplish.  Instead tricking the client into accepting a false 
certificate is much simpler for the MitM.  If an attacker can perform this deception, the 
only active defense mechanism the client has against a MitM attack is rendered useless.  
In this scenario a user no longer has knowledge of whether a MitM exists allowing the 
attacker to glean as much information from the connection as he wants. 
An attacker can take one of two approaches when trying to deceive a client.  The 
first method is exploiting weaknesses in the organizations that issue certificates.  As long 
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as a client trusts the organization, any certificate created and signed by that company is 
accepted by the client.  If an attacker is able to obtain a certificate issued by one of these 
organizations, he can use the certificate with the client without tripping any alerts.  For 
example, on March 15, 2011 Comodo, a Certificate Authority (CA), had one of its user 
accounts breached.  The account was used to issue nine valid certificates with domain 
names such as mail.google.com and login.yahoo.com (Comodo, 2011).  While the breach 
was discovered quickly, the attacker could have stolen numerous usernames and 
passwords to google and yahoo before the certificates were revoked.  This incident only 
illustrates one of the many ways a MitM can posses a fraudulent certificate that is always 
accepted by a client. 
 The second approach a MitM can use to deceive a client is to plant his false 
certificate on the client‟s machine.  When a client receives any certificate, it starts the 
validation process by checking internal lists of approved certificates and CAs.  The client 
considers any certificate in one of these lists to be authentic and will continue with the 
connection.  If an attacker can place his certificate in one of these lists, the client will 
always validate the fake certificate.  Therefore, “[a]n even greater risk is posed by 
unprotected systems when an attacker can preload his/her own trusted root authority 
certificates” (Burkholder, 2002:1).  Finding an unsecure client machine is much easier 
than exploiting a CA. 
 When an attacker successfully deceives a client, the user loses his only active 
defense against a MitM attack.  In this scenario the user needs to be aware of other 
indications that may point to a MitM.  A successful MitM attack requires the adversary to 
be a proxy between two entities, redirecting all traffic in the connection to his own 
4 
 
 
machine and then forwarding packets to their correct destination.  This redirect incurs a 
timing delay not normally seen in a clean connection.  A user may become wary when a 
connection hangs, but without a certificate error warning he does not know if the timing 
delay is caused by a real MitM or other network factors.  Yet even if a user is suspicious 
of a MitM because of a slow connection time, he can assume that the attacker can only 
see encrypted data.  A user has no way of knowing when a MitM is seeing encrypted data 
or when he has successfully deceived the client and obtained the session keys. 
 The goal of this research is to determine if a threshold based on connection time 
can be established, indicating if a MitM exists and whether he is intercepting encrypted 
or plaintext data.  Showing that a statistical difference exists between a normal TLS 
connection, a connection with a passive MitM, and a connection with a MitM who has 
gotten the session keys is the first step in establishing if a baseline can be found.  The 
results from this research can potentially be used to determine the value of the threshold, 
which in turn can be used to create a second warning layer against a MitM attack. 
 The data collected in this experiment looks at the completion time for a TLS 
handshake only.  This part of the protocol is where the two entities authenticate each 
other and negotiate the session keys.  When the MitM sends his own certificate to the 
client so that he can obtain the session keys, the attacker is then required to complete the 
handshake separately with each entity in order for the connection to not be terminated.  
No matter if the MitM uses the session keys to decrypt the messages offline or live on the 
network, he must always perform the same manipulations in the TLS handshake.  Thus, 
only the time it takes to complete the handshake is relevant to this thesis. 
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 The scope of this research only looks at the handshake connection for TLS 
version 1.0.  This experiment also focuses on four of the many available cipher suites 
used with TLS.  A cipher suite is composed of a key exchange algorithm, a cipher 
algorithm, and a MAC algorithm, and it is negotiated during the TLS handshake.  The 
four cipher suites considered in this experiment are chosen because they contain 
commonly used algorithms.  The four cipher suites are 
 tls_rsa_with_rc4_128_md5,  
 tls_rsa_with_rc4_128_sha,  
 tls_rsa_with_aes_128_cbc_sha, and  
 tls_rsa_with_3des_cbc_sha.   
Each component in the cipher suite is used at least once during the TLS handshake, thus 
variations between the algorithms used may affect the results.  If no statistical difference 
can be determined when comparing the results from each cipher suite, then any statistical 
difference between the trials will be the result of the MitMs actions and not the cipher 
suite. 
 The novelty of this research is that it is quantifying the delay induced by a a MitM 
attack.  This thesis takes the first steps in analyzing MitM attacks to determine if a 
baseline can be established that will indicate when a MitM is present.  Because of its 
widespread use, many studies have been conducted analyzing MitM attacks and 
providing suggestions on how to prevent them.  Yet while similarities exist, all of the 
previous studies that were found did not have the same goals or scope as this thesis. 
 For example, in 2002 Peter Burkholder published a report on MitM attacks 
against the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, which is the predecessor to TLS.  He 
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demonstrates how a MitM can be successful against systems that properly implement 
SSL, faulty Internet Explorer (IE) versions, and misconfigured clients (Burkholder, 
2002).  Burkholder discusses the likelihood of a MitM attack in each case and provides 
some recommendations on how to prevent them.  But unlike the goals for this thesis, 
these suggestions only provide ways to avoid MitM attacks, not how actively stop them. 
 Another more recent study was conducted that analyzes a MitM attack against the 
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol, which is one of the few available key 
exchanges for TLS.  In September 2009, Aaron Geary presented his Master‟s thesis with 
details on how to avoid a MitM attack while using the DH key exchange (Geary, 2009).  
The recommendations in this report provide tweaks to the implementation of the protocol 
that would render it more secure.  Again, these suggestions only indicate ways to avoid a 
MitM attack and not how to actively stop it.  Also Geary‟s study focused on the DH key 
exchange, while the experimentation done for this thesis looks at the use of the RSA key 
exchange algorithm in the TLS protocol. 
 A third study done by Benjamin Aziz and Geoff Hamilton looks at how to detect 
MitM attacks using precise timing.  The research focuses on “the ability of mobile 
systems, such as wireless sensors networks, in detecting Mi[t]M attacks in a timely 
fashion” (Aziz and Hamilton, 2009: 1).  The scope of their research looks at these types 
of networks, which rely on distance-bounding protocols.  The similarity between Aziz 
and Hamilton‟s report and this thesis is that both try to determine the existence of a MitM 
using timing.  The difference between the two is that these authors focus on networks 
using distance-bounding protocols while this thesis looks at the use of the TLS protocol.   
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 The remainder of this paper is divided into four main parts.  Chapter 2 gives a 
background on all the pertinent information needed to understand this experiment.  This 
section includes a general overview of public and private key cryptosystems, the Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) and certificates, and a thorough look at the TLS protocol and 
how a MitM would attack it.  Chapter 3 describes the methodology and approach for this 
research.  This chapter summarizes the experiment, annotates the parameters and 
variables, and gives an explanation for the motivation behind certain network 
configurations.  Chapter 4 reveals the results of the experiment along with an analysis of 
the data collected.  Finally, Chapter 5 finishes with a summary of the thesis and any 
suggestions for improvement and future work.   
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II. Background 
 
 
 
 The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a framework of policies that implements 
public key cryptography in an efficient way.  This chapter discusses two cryptographic 
key types, symmetric key and public key, followed by how the PKI is structured to 
manage the public keys.  The chapter then shifts to an overview of the IP/TCP network 
model.  This topic explains how information is sent and received between two entities on 
a network.  Finally, the chapter concludes with an in-depth discussion of the Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) Protocol.  This protocol is used to as a secure authentication 
process in the PKI, providing capabilities such as secure web browsing. 
 
2.1. Cryptography 
 
2.1.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography. 
 
Symmetric key cryptography is where two people or entities share a secret key 
that allows them to exchange encrypted data.  The shared key specifies how to change 
plaintext to ciphertext and then back again.  For this system to work the key must satisfy 
one of two properties.  Either both the key to encrypt the plaintext and the key to decrypt 
the corresponding ciphertext are the same, or by knowing one of the keys, the other key is 
easily derived (Adams and others, 2003). 
Stream ciphers and block ciphers are two methods for encryption with a 
symmetric key.  Stream ciphers feed data into an algorithm a small piece at a time.  For 
example, if a sentence is encrypted with a stream cipher, each character is independently 
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fed into the algorithm.  The output is concatenated to the end of the previous result to 
create a full ciphertext.  An example of a stream cipher is the Rivest Cipher 4, which was 
created by Ron Rivest in 1987 (Mantin, 2001). 
The second method of encryption that uses a symmetric key is called a block 
cipher.  Instead of small pieces, this type of cipher feeds blocks of data through an 
algorithm, where the resulting data block is often used in processing the next chunk of 
data.  Well known examples of block ciphers include the Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) families. 
 Many advantages are offered with symmetric key cryptography.  The 
implementation of this cryptosystem takes very little time, memory, and computing 
power (Adams and others, 2003:9). No matter the size of the plaintext or ciphertext, 
encrypting and decrypting text is fast and efficient.  Yet even with the small 
implementation size, using symmetric keys has its disadvantages.  The first drawback is 
that the secret key needs to be shared securely between two entities.  An out-of-band 
exchange of keys must take place, which becomes more difficult as the distance between 
the entities grow.  Another disadvantage of using symmetric keys is the inability to 
determine if a new entity is an imposter or not.  Before a new key is shared, the identity 
of the new contact must be verified, but without prior knowledge of the person, no one 
would know that Alice is in fact Mallory.  The last major shortcoming of using a 
symmetric key cryptosystem is that it is not easily scalable.  A different key is needed for 
each unique connection.  For example, if Bob has 12 different contacts, he needs 12 
different keys to securely communicate with each person.  To generalize, for n number of 
users, up to n
2
/2 unique keys may be required (Adams and others, 2003:10).  Thus as an 
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organization grows, the storage and maintenance for all of the keys becomes too 
unwieldy to manage. 
 
2.1.2 Public Key Cryptography. 
 
 Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman first suggested the concept of a public key 
cryptosystem in 1970 (Trappe and Washington, 2006:164). This notion was 
unprecedented because it required the encryption key to be publically known.  Today, 
public key cryptosystems are widely used and is defined by the following conditions.  For 
M set of possible messages, K set of keys, the encryption function Ek, and the decryption 
function Dk, 
1. and  for every and every . 
2. For every m and every k, the values of  and   are easy to 
compute. 
3. For almost every  if someone knows only the function Ek, it is 
computationally infeasible to find an algorithm to compute Dk. 
4. Given  it is easy to find functions Ek and Dk.   
(Trappe and Washington, 2006:190) 
 
The first condition ensures that the encryption and decryption are inverse transforms.  
Even though the two keys are distinctly different, the encryption function results in a 
ciphertext that the decryption function must transform correctly back to the plaintext.  
The second condition ensures that the encryption and decryption functions are efficient.  
Any benefits of a public key cryptosystem are nullified if the implementation is not 
proficient.  The third condition states that a public key must exist.  This property is what 
makes a public key cryptosystem novel compared to using a symmetric key.  The public 
key maintains security because the generation of the key incorporates concepts pulled 
from mathematically hard problems.  For example, knowing that factoring a large number 
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into two large primes is still computationally infeasible allows for the generation of 
secure key pairs. The final condition states that given a key, the encryption and 
decryption functions must be easily identifiable.  In other words, the algorithm for 
encryption and decryption are publically known.  Security rests in the generation of key 
pairs and should not depend on keeping the algorithm proprietary. 
Because of the public key, this cryptosystem has many advantages that a 
symmetric key cannot provide.  Authentication is the first benefit a public key can offer.  
Public keys are bound to entities in objects called certificates.  With trust in how these 
certificates are created and managed, posing as another person is nearly impossible.  
Unlike with symmetric keys, two parties previously unknown to each other can be 
confident that the other person is who he claims to be. 
 Public keys also allow for Confidentiality, which means that the intended receiver 
is the only person that can read the data.  Yet encrypting and decrypting data with a 
public key system becomes computationally intensive as the size of the plaintext grows 
(Trappe and Washington, 2006:5).  The longer the plaintext, the more time, memory, and 
computing power is needed.  Therefore confidentiality is provided through the 
establishment of a symmetric key, since they are more efficient in encrypting large 
amounts of data.  Key establishment can occur in two ways; either through key transfer or 
key agreement.  With key transfer, Alice generates the symmetric key, encrypts it with 
Bob‟s public key, and then sends the resulting ciphertext to Bob.  With key agreement, 
Alice and Bob both generate variables, exchange them, and then uses those variables to 
generate the symmetric key locally.  At least one or more of these variables are encrypted 
with a public key to be sent securely across the network. 
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 Integrity provides confidence to a user that data has not been changed or 
corrupted either during transfer or over time (Adams and others, 2003:37).  A public key 
cryptosystem provides integrity with the use of hash functions.  Hash functions take a 
message of an arbitrary length as input and produces a fixed length result called a 
message digest.  A cryptographic hash function must have the following three properties: 
1. Given a message m, the message digest h(m) can be calculated quickly. 
2. Given a y, it is computationally infeasible to find an m′ with h(m′) = y 
3. It is computationally infeasible to find messages m1 and m2 with h(m1) = h(m2) 
(Trappe and Washington, 2006 218-219) 
  
The first property assures that the hash is efficient.  The second property states that the 
hash function must be one-way.  In other words, given a particular hash value finding an 
input value that results in that hash value is computationally hard.  Finally, the third 
property says that finding two different input values that hash to the same output value 
must also be computationally infeasible.  The most commonly used hashes come from the 
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) and the Message Digest (MD) families. 
 To provide integrity to data, hash algorithms are used as a basis for creating a 
Message Authentication Code (MAC).  The data to be secured is combined with a secret 
key to be inputs for a hash function.  Commonly known as keyed-hash algorithms, this 
method provides added security to the data by using a secret key negotiated with public 
key cryptography.  Many different keyed-hash algorithms exist with the most prevalent 
being the Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC).  The final result of the 
keyed hash algorithm is the MAC, which is appended to the data.  Because of the MAC, 
any changes to or corruption of the data is easily noticeable.  One would only have to 
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recalculate the MAC and compare it to the original value.  If the two values are different 
then the data has been altered in some way.   
 Non-repudiation means that one cannot deny any data that he has sent.  A public 
key cryptosystem provides non-repudiation through the use of digital signatures.  A 
digital signature is created when data, usually the MAC, is encrypted with the private 
key.  In this way the digital signature cannot be forged as long as the private key is kept 
secret.  Anyone else having access and use of the private key besides the owner is 
considered to be computationally infeasible.  The signature itself is easily verified by any 
entity since the public key is openly accessible to all users.  Two of the most commonly 
used public key algorithms today are the Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm and the RSA 
algorithm. 
 
2.2. Public Key Infrastructure 
 
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) was developed to generate and manage the 
keys of a public key cryptosystem.  Some of the services that a PKI can provide to users 
are secure email, secure web access, and Virtual Private Networks (VPNS).  The PKI 
consists of “policies defining rules under which the cryptographic systems operate” 
(Trappe and Washington, 2006:270).  Trust is a key element to PKI, and users must trust 
that the policies are implemented correctly and securely.  Without confidence in the 
generation, authenticity, and validity of the public keys and how they are managed, PKI 
would fall apart. 
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2.2.1. Public Key Infrastructure Entities and Functionality. 
 
 A Certificate Authority (CA) is responsible for creating all public and private key 
pairs for an organization in the PKI.  When the CA creates a new key pair, it must verify 
that the client requesting the keys is not an imposter.  After verification of the client, the 
CA creates a new key pair, giving the private key to the client and putting the public key, 
along with information about the client, in a data structure called a certificate.  The CA 
then uses its own private key that it generated to digitally sign the certificate information.  
The resulting signature is appended to the end of the certificate.  In this way the CA binds 
each entity to a public key.  Since the CA creates its own public and private key, users 
must fully trust the CA because its certificate cannot be authenticated.  But, with this trust 
a user can be confident in the authenticity of any certificate that the CA signs. 
 The CA has the ability to appoint a Registration Authority (RA) to also perform 
bindings.  In implementing a PKI for a large organization an RA provides “scalability 
and decrease [in] operational costs” (Adams and others, 2003:86).  The responsibilities of 
the RA can include confirming the identities of clients, requesting a new certificate from 
the CA on behalf of a user, and generating new key material for clients (Adams and 
others, 2003:86-87).  The RA is able to perform these and many other functions with a 
certificate that is signed by the CA.  Since the CA is deemed trustworthy, then any 
certificate signed by the RA is considered to be legitimate as well.  This concept is called 
Certificate Hierarchy and is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 Besides the CA and RA, the PKI incorporates many other entities and 
functionality.  Certificate Repositories are databases containing the public certificates that  
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Figure 1. Certification Hierarchy (Trappe and Washington, 2006:272) 
 
 
 
have been signed and published by the CA.  Any user in the PKI must have access to all 
the public keys for the organization in order for the cryptosystem to work.  The 
repositories allow for quick and easy access to the certificates.  Certificate Revocation 
Lists (CRLs) are records containing all the certificates that are not longer valid.  An 
invalid certificate has either been compromised or has expired.  Every user must know if 
a certificate should no longer be used, and the CRLs provide the mechanism for checking 
the certificates.   
The PKI also facilitates Key Back-Up and Recovery system.  A user forgetting his 
password, break the medium holding the private key, or in any other way render the 
private key unusable is not uncommon.  Without the private key any data that has been 
encrypted with the corresponding public key is no longer accessible.  This same situation 
arises when a certificate has been either compromised or expired.  The Key Back-Up and 
Recovery structure stores the decrypting key for every certificate, but never the signing 
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RA 
CA 
Client Client Client Client 
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key.  Therefore, a user would be able to recover any encrypted data, but does not have the 
ability to sign or encrypt any new data.   
 
2.2.2. Public Key Certificates. 
 
Certificates are signed data structures that bind an entity to a public key.  Loren 
Kohnfelder was the first to suggest the concept of a certificate in 1978 (Adams and 
others, 2003:70).  Two types of certificates exist; identity certificates and credential 
certificates.  Identity certificate are more commonly used, and they contain a public key 
and the information about the entity that owns it.  Credential certificates are used for 
defining access rights to certain objects.  Many certificate formats are used in the world 
today, but the most prevalent format is the X.509 Public Key certificate.  The X.509 
certificate has three different versions and the structure for version 3 if found in Figure 2.  
Key elements of this figure are the Subject Public Key Info and the Digital Signature.  
The Subject Public Key Info contains the public key and an ID to know what algorithm 
the public key is used with.  The Digital Signature is used to validate the integrity of the 
data and person associated with the certificate.  If a client can verify the Digital 
Signature, then he knows that the certificate was issued by an authorized entity, the 
owner of the certificate is who he says he is, and data in the certificate has not been 
changed in anyway. 
 
2.3. Network Protocols 
 
  Interoperability between systems is essential.  Computers need to be able 
“to communicate and work together with no information about each other beyond 
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compliance with certain standards” (Loshin, 2003:25).  These standards are known as 
protocols, which are a set of rules used to define every type of communication going 
across a network.  Every protocol created must specify and define the following: 
1. how an interaction is initiated, 
2. what type of interactions are permitted, 
3. what constitutes as a valid request and response, 
4. what to do when an invalid message is received, 
5. what proper formatting is for both data packaging and protocol messages, and 
6. rules on what behaviors and types of data are acceptable, unacceptable, or 
preferred. 
These specifications ensure that all data is sent and received across a network properly 
and efficiently. 
Different protocols have been developed for each stage of transportation across a 
network, and these protocols are sorted based upon which layer they operate in, as 
defined in the TCP/IP model.  The approach for this model is to implement the protocol 
first and then specify it second.  This method allows for greater flexibility and less 
structure, as compared to the OSI model (Kurose and Ross, 2010: 53-54).  The TCP/IP 
model specifies four layers; the Application layer, Transport layer, Internet layer, and 
Network Interface layer; but allows for the use of other layers as well.  The model also 
details how the layers are ordered, but does not mandate that the ordering has to be 
followed.  Figure 3 illustrates the four layers of the TCP/IP model and how they can be 
layered on top of each other. 
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Figure 2. X.509 Version 3 Certificate Structure (Adams and others, 2003:72) 
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Figure 3. The TCP/IP Model (Loshin, 2003:80) 
  
 
 
 The Network Interface layer is considered the lowest level of the TCP/IP model.  
Interaction on this layer occurs directly between two IP nodes, where data is transmitted 
between Media Access Control (MAC) addresses.  One of the most well known protocols 
at this level is the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP).  Across Ethernet networks, ARP 
provides the mechanisms for mapping MAC addresses to Internet layer addresses. 
 The Internet layer is the second lowest layer of the TCP/IP model.  This layer 
provides abstraction by enabling “seamless interoperation between nodes on any local 
network, using any operating system, any hardware platform, and with no prior 
knowledge about communicating nodes beyond their internet addresses” (Loshin, 
2003:96).  Many functions for network communication are provided by the internet layer, 
including transmitting data between the network interface layer, routing data to its correct 
destination, and handling packet fragmentation and errors.  One of the greatest 
advantages of this layer is its ability to sustain large and dynamic networks where speed 
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and availability can drastically fluctuate at any moment.  The most common internet layer 
protocol is the Internet Protocol (IP).  This protocol defines how nodes communicate 
across the internet, how IP nodes handle IP packets, and how outbound packets are 
addressed.  This protocol is also responsible for defining the internet address space.   
The Transport layer follows the Internet layer in the TCP/IP model.  This layer 
facilitates the communication between running processes on different nodes.  The 
transport layer acts as a go between for the network and application.  Application data is 
prepared and sent over the network and receiving data is processed back into readable 
data for the application.   
 The two most widely used protocols in the Transport layer are the User Data 
Protocol (UDP) and the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).  UDP provides the bare 
minimum to the Transport layer.  This protocol is a best effort one that is unable to 
correct for corrupt or lost messages.  TCP, on the other hand, allows for a reliable 
connection with guaranteed delivery of data.  TCP provides many services, including 
basic data transfer, reliability, flow control, and multiplexing. 
The services provided by a TCP connection is established through a 
synchronization process known as a Three-Way Handshake, as illustrated in Figure 4.  
Host A begins by requesting to open a TCP connection with Host B.  If Host B wants to 
continue the connection, it sends a segment acknowledging the request made by Host A 
as well as making its own request for connection.  Host A then completes the handshake 
with a third message by acknowledging the request made by Host B.  With this final  
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Three-Way Handshake 
Host A  Host B 
Send TCP open request 
    -SYN bit set 
    -Sequence Number = 167 
  
  Receive the open request 
Send a response 
    -SYN, ACK bits set 
    -Sequence Number = 321 
    -Acknowledgment Number = 168 
Receive the Acknowledgement 
Send a response 
    -ACK bit set 
    -Sequence Number = 168 
    - Acknowledgment Number = 322 
  
  Receive the Acknowledgment 
Handshake is complete 
Figure 4. TCP Three-Way Handshake (Loshin, 2003:367) 
  
 
 
message a TCP connection is established and application data can be sent.  Either host 
can then initiate the end of the connection by sending a close segment.  
 The Application layer is the final and top most layer of the TCP/IP model.  The 
communication in this layer can be between people, people and systems, or systems.  The 
functionality for the application layer includes, but is not limited to, file sharing, network 
management, and even video conferencing.  This layer also addresses the formatting of 
application data using standards such as Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) to do so. 
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2.4. The Transport Layer Security Protocol 
 
 In the early 1990‟s, Netscape introduced a web browser named Navigator, which 
used the proprietary Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol (Loshin, 2003:335).  Shortly 
after Navigator‟s release, SSL was made public, which allowed the community to help 
improve the protocol.  SSL soon became the most widespread standard for secure web 
browsing and still is today.  In 1999, the SSL protocol received an overhaul and the 
resulting version become known as the Transport Layer Security (TLS).  This protocol 
operates between the application and transport layers by encrypting and decrypting the 
data.  TLS consists of multiple sub-protocols, each with its own functionality that adds to 
the establishment and security of the connection.  The following sections detail each of 
these sub-protocols and discuss the security and cryptographic elements incorporated in 
TLS. 
 
2.4.1. The Record Protocol. 
 
 The Record Protocol, or the record layer, is used to ensure that a connection is 
confidential and trustworthy.  This layer is responsible for preparing and unpacking the 
data between the application and network.  On the sending side, the data preparation 
includes fragmenting, encrypting, and possibly compressing the data before it is sent.  
The record layer unpacks the data by reassembling, decrypting, and decompressing it.  
The data is then verified before it is sent up to the application. 
 In order for the record layer to perform the data preparation correctly, it must 
have a shared connection state with other entity.  The connection state consists of a 
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compression algorithm, an encryption algorithm, and a MAC algorithm along with any 
parameters that is needed to perform them.  This state is negotiated with the Handshake 
Protocol and instantiated with the Change Cipher Spec Protocol.  Once the connection 
state is agreed upon, but before it can be used, the record layer generates all the secret 
keys needed for the connection.  
 When a connection state is established, the record layer can begin securing data 
for transmission.  If the data to be sent is greater than 2
14
 bytes, the record layer begins 
the preparation process with fragmentation.  Once the data is in blocks of 2
14
 bytes or 
less, it data is compressed based upon the negotiated compression method.  Finally a 
MAC is calculated and appended to the end of the data before it is encrypted as indicated 
by the connection state.  The data is then sent across the network to the receiving host. 
 On the receiving end, the data must be unpacked based upon the connection state 
and verified by the Record layer.  First, the data is decrypted and the MAC value is 
checked to make sure that the data has not been altered in any way.  If the MAC value is 
verified the data is decompressed.  When all parts of the data have been collected, the 
record layer reassembles any and all fragments before sending it up to the application. 
 
2.4.2. The Handshake Protocol. 
 
The Handshake Protocol is responsible for negotiating session variables between 
clients through a handshaking process.  A synopsis of all of the session parameters can be 
found in Table 1.  By the end of the handshake exchange the clients have agreed upon the 
version of TLS to use, a public key encryption method, a cipher algorithm, and a MAC 
algorithm.  The handshake is also used to authenticate the entities to each other.   
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Table 1.    Session Parameters for TLS Handshake Protocol  
Parameters Definitions 
Session 
Identifier 
An arbitrary byte sequence chosen by the server to identify an active 
or resumable session state. 
Peer 
Certificate 
X509v3 certificate of the peer.  This element of the state may be null 
Compression 
Method 
The algorithm used to compress data prior to encryption 
Cipher Spec Specifies the pseudorandom function (PRF) used to generate keying 
material, the bulk data encryption algorithm and the MAC algorithm.  
It also defines cryptographic attributes such as the mac_length. 
Master Secret 48-byte secret shared between the client and server 
Is Resumable A flag indicating whether the session can be used to initiate new 
connections. 
(Dierks and Rescorla, 2008: 27) 
 
 
 
Client  Server 
ClientHello ----------------->  
  ServerHello 
  Certificate* 
  ServerKeyExchange* 
  CertificateRequest* 
 <---------------- ServerHelloDone 
Certificate*   
ClientKeyExchange   
CertificateVerify*   
[ChangeCipherSpec]   
Finished ---------------->  
  [ChangeCipherSpec] 
 <---------------- Finished 
Application Data <----------------> Application Data 
Figure 5. Message Flow for Full TLS Handshake (Dierks and Rescorla, 2008:35) 
*Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent 
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The server is always authenticated by its certificate, but client authentication is only 
optional.   
The TLS Handshake Protocol consists of nine messages, five of which must 
always be sent.  Figure 5 illustrates these messages and how they are sent during the 
handshake.  These messages are used to accomplish the following tasks: 
1. Exchange hello messages to agree on algorithms, exchange random values, and 
check for session resumption. 
2. Exchange the necessary cryptographic parameters to allow the client and server to 
agree on a premaster secret. 
3. Exchange certificates and cryptographic information to allow the client and server 
to authenticate themselves. 
4. Generate a master secret from the premaster secret and exchanged random values. 
5. Provide security parameters to the record layer. 
6. Allow the client and server to verify that their peers has calculated the same 
security parameters and that the handshake occurred without tampering by an 
attacker.     (Deirks and Rescorla, 2008:34) 
 
The following sections describe each of these messages and how they contribute to the 
protocol.  The scope of this thesis only pertains to the ClientHello, ServerHello, 
Certificate, ServerHelloDone, ClientKeyExchange, and Finished messages.  More 
information about the other optional messages can be found in (Deirks and Rescorla, 
2008).  As in the RFC 2246, the messages are presented in the order they must be sent. 
 
 2.4.2.1. ClientHello Message. 
 
The ClientHello message is sent by the client to initiate a connection with a 
server.  This message contains five key elements to be sent to the server that help 
determine the session variables.  These items are a protocol version, a random value, a 
session ID, cipher suites, and compression methods.  The protocol version indicates to the 
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server the highest TLS Protocol that the client supports.  Each version has a slightly 
different implementation, which means that the client and server must agree on the best 
protocol available to both entities. 
 The random value is an integer generated by the client in two parts.  The first four 
bytes of this number is the current date and time based upon the internal clock of the 
client machine.  This timestamp is represented in the standard UNIX 32-bit format.  For 
the second part of the value, the client randomly generates 28 bytes.  The resulting 32 
byte number is considered the client random value and it is sent to the server to be used 
later in the protocol. 
The session ID is a 32 byte number that the server creates during the handshake to 
associate each client with a particular session.  If a client wants to use the same security 
parameters from a previous session, then it sends the session ID from that connection to 
the server in the ClientHello.  If this field is empty, the client either has never connected 
to the server before or wants to negotiate new security parameters.  A new session ID 
becomes valid when the handshaking is complete and remains so for as long as the server 
implementation specifies. 
The client then composes a list of cipher suites and compression methods that it is 
capable of executing.  A cipher suite consists of a key exchange algorithm, a bulk 
encryption algorithm, and a MAC algorithm.  There is no limit to how many cipher suites 
and compression methods the client can send.  When sent in the ClientHello, these lists 
are ordered based upon the client‟s preference with the most desirable first. 
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 2.4.2.2. ServerHello Message. 
 
The server sends a ServerHello message in response to the ClientHello.  This 
message also has five key elements, each in response to the ones in the ClientHello.  
Based on the protocol version sent by the client, the server determines the highest version 
supported by both entities.  The version sent in the ServerHello is the one to be adhered 
to throughout the rest of the connection.  The server also generates a 32 byte random 
value following the same format as the client random number.  This value must be 
generated independently of the client nonce.  The server random value is combined with 
the client random value later in the protocol to generate keying material. 
If a session ID is sent in the ClientHello message, the server looks in a cache for a match.  
If one exists the server may decide to use the same security parameters from that previous 
session.  In this case, the server echoes back the same session ID value in the 
ServerHello.  The two entities can then proceed straight to the Finished messages.  The 
server may decide that it does not want to use the previous security parameters.  The 
server also may not be able to find a match to the session ID in the cache, or the client 
might have left the field empty.  In all of these cases the server creates a new session ID.  
This new value is sent back to the client in the ServerHello, indicating that a new session 
was created.  If the server does not support caching of security parameters it leaves this 
field blank. 
 Finally, the server decides the cipher suite and compression algorithm to use in 
the connection.  Based upon the lists sent in the ClientHello message, the server ensures 
that the most secure cipher suite and compression algorithm is chosen.  The selected 
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algorithms are sent to the client in the ServerHello.  If the server decides to resume a 
previous session, the cipher suite and compression method from that previous session are 
sent in the message. 
 
 2.4.2.3. Certificate Messages. 
 
After the ServerHello message, the server sends its X.509 certificate to the client 
in the Certificate message.  This message must be sent if the key exchange method 
requires the use of certificates for authentication.  The server should make sure that the 
certificate it sends is appropriate for the key exchange.  The message itself contains the 
certificate chain for the server‟s certificate.  The first certificate in the message is the 
server‟s followed by the certificate that signed it.  Each proceeding certificate is the one 
that signed the previous certificate in the list.  This chain continues with all certificates up 
to, but not necessarily including, the root certificate.  The root certificate may be omitted 
since the client should already posses it.   
 
 2.4.2.4. ServerHelloDone Message. 
 
 After the server has sent all required messages in the initial handshake segment, it 
sends the ServerHelloDone.  This message indicates that the server is done sending 
messages for the key exchange and is now waiting for the client‟s response.  Once the 
client receives the ServerHelloDone message, it verifies that the server‟s certificate is 
authentic before continuing on with the handshake. 
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 2.4.2.5. ClientKeyExchange Message. 
 
The ClientKeyExchange is sent by the client after the ServerHelloDone message.  
The singular purpose of this message is to securely exchange information that is later 
used to create the session keys.  Depending upon the key exchange method, the 
information in this message is either the premaster secret or variables used to create the 
premaster secret.  
 For the RSA algorithm, the client generates a 48 byte premaster secret to send to 
the server.  The first 2 bytes of the premaster secret is the protocol version that the client 
sent in the ClientHello.  This version number may not be the same one the protocol is 
currently running under.  This value is used to protect the connection from a playback 
attack.  The next 46 bytes is a random value securely generated by the client.  The 
premaster secret is then encrypted with the server‟s public key, which was sent in the 
Certificate message.  Once encrypted, the premaster secret is sent to the server in the 
ClientKeyExchange message. 
 For a DH key exchange, the ClientKeyExchange message is used to send the DH 
public value.  The public value could have been sent in the Certificate message as part of 
the server‟s certificate.  In this case, the ClientKeyExchange is still sent but remains 
empty.  After the ClientKeyExchange message is sent, each entity uses the DH variables 
to compute the premaster secret independently. 
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 2.4.2.6. Finished Message. 
 
The Finished message is used to verify that the key exchange between the client 
and server was successful.  This message must always be sent after the Change Cipher 
Spec message.  The Finished message is the first one sent using the newly negotiated 
secrets, keys, and algorithms.  Both sides compute and send this message, usually with 
the client sending the message first.  The data in the Finished message is computed as 
follows: 
verify_data = PRF(master_secret, finished_label, Hash(handshake_messages)) 
 [0 . . verify_data_length] (1) 
where the parameters are defined in Table 2.  When a Finished message is received, the 
entity must compare the PRF value it computed with the one in the message.  If the 
values are the same, then the key exchange was successful and the application data can 
now be sent.  If the values are different, then the message cannot be authenticated and a 
fatal error occurs. 
 
2.4.3. ChangeCipherSpec Protocol. 
 
The ChangeCipherSpec protocol is used to instantiate the newly negotiated 
connection state.  From this point forward Record layer compresses and encrypts the data 
based on the agreed algorithms.  This message is sent in the middle of the handshake by 
both entities.  The ChangeCipherSpec message comes after the authentication and key 
exchange messages, but it must come before the Finished messages. 
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Table 2.    Parameters for Finished Message 
Parameters Definitions 
master_secret Value generated by each entity independently based upon 
variables sent through the Handshake message 
finished_label For Finished messages sent by the client, the string “client 
finished”.  For Finished messages sent by the server, the string 
“server finished”. 
handshake_messages All of the data from all messages in this handshake (not 
including any HelloRequest messages) up to, but not including, 
this message.  This is only data visible at the handshake layer 
and does not include record layer headers. 
Hash The Hash must be the same one defined and used the PRF 
verify_data_length The length depends on the chosen cipher suite, but the default is 
12 bytes.  Any other value must at least be 12 bytes. 
(Dierks and Rescorla, 2008:63-64) 
 
 
2.4.4. Alert Protocol. 
 
 Alert messages are sent to notify an entity of an error.  Errors have two severity 
types; warning and fatal.  If a fatal error occurs, the connection ends immediately, and the 
session ID becomes invalid, preventing the security parameters of that session from being 
used again.  If an error occurs with a warning level the appropriate alert is sent and the 
receiving end decides if it wants to continues or terminate the connection.  If the entity 
decides to terminate the connection it sends a fatal error.  The two types of alerts defined 
in the TLS Protocol are Closure Alerts and Error Alerts.  A closure alert indicates that 
messages will no longer be sent.  Any data received after the close notify alert is ignored.  
Both the client and server are able to send this message.  When received, the entity must 
immediately send its own closure alert and shut down the connection.  Error alert 
messages notify the other entity that an error has occurred in the process of executing the 
protocol.  A list of all the error alerts and their definitions can be found in Appendix A. 
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2.4.5. Application Data. 
 The Application Data is used only after a successful handshake.  This protocol is 
encapsulated within the Record layer and contains the data from the higher level client.  
This data can include HTTP requests and file transfer data. 
 
2.4.6. Security Parameters. 
 
 The Security Parameters are the variables negotiated between the client and server 
during the handshake.  These parameters are used by the record layer to determine the 
current connection state and create the session keys.  All of the security parameters are 
enumerated and defined in Table 3.  The first parameter, the Connection End, simply 
defines which entity is the client and which entity is the server. 
 
 
Table 3.    Security Parameters for a Connection State in the Record layer 
Parameters Definitions 
Connection End Is this entity the “client” or the “server” in the connection 
PRF Algorithm The pseudorandom function is an algorithm used to generate keys 
from a master secret 
Bulk Encryption 
Algorithm 
Includes key size of the algorithm, whether it is a block, stream, or 
AEAD cipher, the block size of the cipher, and the lengths of 
explicit and implicit nonces 
MAC Algorithm Used for message authentication.  Includes the size of the value 
returned by the MAC algorithm 
Compression 
Algorithm 
Used for data compression.  This includes all parameters needed in 
order to perform the compression 
Master Secret a 48-byte secret shared between the two entities of the connection 
Client Random a 32-byte value provided by the client 
Server Random a 32-byte value provided by the server 
(Deirks and Rescorla, 2008:16-17) 
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2.4.6.1. The Pseudorandom Function. 
 
The Pseudorandom Function (PRF) is used for key generation as well as 
verification between the client and the server.  The PRF is a function that takes in three 
variables; a secret, a seed, and a label; and returns an output value of some arbitrary 
length.  The equation for the general PRF is as follows: 
 PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_hash(secret, label || seed) (2) 
where secret is a shared key, label is a defined string, and  seed  is the data that the PRF 
is used on.  The P_hash function is defined as follows: 
P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) || seed) || 
  HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) || seed) || 
  HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) || seed) || … (3) 
where the function A( ) is defined as: 
 A(0) = seed 
 A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) (4) 
The HMAC_hash that is used here is explicitly defined in the RFC, and varies between 
TLS Version 1.1 and TLS Version 1.2.  The P_hash function is then iterated as many 
times needed to produce the number of bytes required. 
 
 2.4.6.2. Bulk Encryption Algorithm. 
 
 The encryption algorithm is used by the Record layer to change the plaintext data 
into ciphertext before sending it across the network.  The available cipher options vary 
between the three versions of TLS as well as implementations. 
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 2.4.6.3. Message Authentication Code Algorithm. 
 
 The MAC is used in TLS for message authentication.  The MAC is computed 
using the compressed data as input, and the resulting value is appended to the end of the 
data before it is encrypted.  The HMAC is the algorithm used to calculate the MAC, and 
the hash used for the basis of the HMAC is negotiated in the handshake.  The available 
hash algorithms is dependent upon the TLS version and implementation in use.   
The equation for calculating the MAC is as follows: 
HMAC_hash (MAC_write_secret, seq_num || TLStype ||  
 TLSversion || TLSlength || TLSfragment) (5) 
where MAC_write_secret is computed from the key block, seq_num is the sequence 
number for the Record message, TLStype, TLSversion, and TLSlength, are the header 
information for the Record layer, and TLSfragment is the data being sent.  The sequence 
number is an 8 byte value used as a security measure in the Record layer.  When a new  
connection state is made active the sequence number is set to zero in the first message 
sent under the new connection state.  The sequence number is incremented by one after 
each message that is sent in that connection state.   
 
 2.4.6.4. Compression Algorithm. 
  
The compression algorithm is used in the Record layer to compress data before it 
is encrypted.  The current TLS Protocol defines the compression algorithm as null, with 
no other options available.  Thus, the Record layer does not compress any of the data that 
it sends to another entity.  Yet, while the TLS Protocol does not define any compression 
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algorithms, (Hollenbeck, 2004) does define one that can be used.  This RFC also 
describes how to negotiate this algorithm as well as how to specify any additional 
algorithms one might want to use. 
 
 2.4.6.5. The Master Secret. 
 
 The master secret is a 48 byte shared key that both the client and the server 
generate independently based upon shared variables.  The master secret is used to 
generate all the session keys for the connection, and it is used in the Finished message to 
verify that the client and server are the same entities that began the connection.  The 
master secret is calculated as follows: 
 master_secret = PRF(premaster_secret, “master secret”, 
 client_random || server_random)[0…47]  (6) 
where premaster_secret is generated in the handshake,  client_random is the 32 byte 
value from the client, and server_random is the 32 byte value from the server.  The first 
48 bytes resulting from the PRF becomes the master secret. 
 
 2.4.6.6. The Session Keys. 
 
When a connection state has been negotiated, but before it can be used, the 
Record layer needs to generate the session keys.  Up to six different keys may be 
produced based upon the selected algorithms in the connection state.  These keys are as 
follows: client MAC key, server MAC key, client encryption key, server encryption key, 
client IV and server IV.  The client uses the client variables for processing the sending 
data and it uses the server variables for processing the receiving data.  The server follows 
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the same pattern using the server variables for outgoing data and the client variables for 
incoming data.   
To calculate these variables the Record layer uses the PRF to create a key block 
as follows: 
key_block = PRF(master_secret, “key expansion”,  
 server_random || client_random)  (7) 
where master_secret is a shared secret, and server_random  and client_random are 
provided in the handshake.  Once the key_block is created, it is divided to the different 
keys.  This partitioning can be represented as follows: 
key_block = client_MAC_key [mac_key_length] ||  
  server_MAC_Key [mac_key_length] ||  
  client_key [encrypt_key_length] ||  
  server_key [encrypt_key_length] ||  
  client_IV [fixed_nonce_length] ||  
  server_IV [fixed_nonce_length] (8) 
The lengths of each key vary based upon the connection state.  Any keys that are not 
needed for a particular connection are left empty. 
 
 
2.5. A Man-in-the-Middle Attack against a TLS Connection 
 
In order for a MitM to be successful against a TLS connection, the MitM must 
acquire the pre-master secret.  With this value the MitM can create all the session keys 
for the current connection and decrypt the messages at his leisure.  To obtain the session 
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keys without notice, the MitM needs to have full control over the TLS protocol and must 
be able to execute all parts of the TLS handshake.   
A diagram of a MitM attack on a TLS connection can be found in Figure 6.  To begin, the 
client sends the ClientHello message to the server.  The MitM allows this message to 
reach the server, while recording the client random value in the process.  The server 
replies with three messages; the ServerHello, the Certificate, and the ServerDone 
messages.  The MitM saves the server random value, the chosen TLS version, and the 
chosen cipher suite from the ServerHello without making any alterations. Then the MitM 
replaces the server‟s certificate with his own before passing the message on to the client.  
From the server‟s certificate the MitM obtains the public key of the server to use later.  
The certificate message is also stored for the calculation of the final finish message.  The 
ServerDone message has no relevant information for the MitM.  This message is stored 
for the final finish message and passed to the client without any changes. 
When the client receives the messages from the server it replies with three 
messages of its own; the ClientKeyExchange, the ChangeCipherSpec, and the encrypted  
Finished messages.  Since the client received the MitM‟s certificate, it encrypted 
the pre-master secret with the MitM‟s public key.  The MitM decrypts this message to get 
the pre-master secret and then re-encrypts the message with the server‟s public key.  The 
ChangeCipherSpec message is not altered in anyway and does not need to be stored since 
it is not used in the final finish message.  The MitM then decrypts the Finished message 
to store, but it must not send it to the server.  Since the MitM sent the client a different 
certificate then what the server sent, the calculated finish hash value is different between 
the server and client.  The MitM must create the correct Finished hash that corresponds 
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Figure 6. Man-in-theMiddle Attack on a TLS Connection 
(dashed boxes indicate messages changed by the MitM) 
 
with the messages sent and received by the server.  When the MitM makes all the 
appropriate changes it sends all three messages to the server. 
Upon receipt of the three messages from the client the server decrypts the 
ClientKeyExchange to get the pre-master secret, calculates the session keys, and then 
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verifies the Finished message.  When the message is verified the server responds to the 
client with its own ChangeCipherSpec and encrypted Finished message.  Again, the 
ChangeCipherSpec is not changed and does not need to be stored.  The MitM may want 
to decrypt the server‟s Finished message if the cipher that is used is a chaining block 
cipher, but after that the message can be discarded.  Instead, the MitM creates the 
Finished hash that corresponds with the messages sent and received by the client, 
encrypts it, and sends both the ChangeCipherSpec and encrypted Finished message to the 
client.  When the client verifies the server‟s Finished message the TLS Handshake is 
complete. 
The client can now continue with the connection by sending a request for data to 
the server, and the server responds with the information.  This exchange is encrypted and 
seen as Application Data in the TLS connection.  Since the MitM has successfully gained 
the session keys he has two options.  The first is to store all the data sent in the 
connection to be decrypted at a later time.  The second option is that the MitM can 
decrypt the messages live.     
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III. Experimentation 
 
 
3.1. Research Goal 
 When a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) is able to trick the client into accepting his 
own certification he can successfully obtain information from a TLS connection without 
a warning being sent to the client.  As the protection of data becomes more vital with the 
increase of network usage, knowing when an attacker has access to that information is 
imperative.  The invalid certificate warning is the only active defense mechanism a user 
has to know that an attacker is present, and it allows the user the opportunity to 
discontinue the connection before any data can be stolen.  When the MitM suppresses 
this message, the user no longer has a real-time defense against a MitM attack.  The goal 
of this research is to quantify the delay imposed by a MitM attack.  This research will 
determine if developing a signature based on the completion time of the TLS handshake 
is possible, which will detect a MitM.  If discovered, this baseline can potentially be used 
to create a secondary defense mechanism after the certificate warning message to alert a 
user of a MitM. 
 
3.2. Methodology and Approach 
 
 The experiment for this research involves running three trials four different times, 
once for each cipher suite used.  Trial 1 is considered to be the baseline of the 
experiment.  In this first trial, a client connects to a web server using TLS without the 
presence of a MitM.  Trial 2 adds the MitM as a proxy between the client and server, but 
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without any manipulation of the packets.  This trial represents when an attacker has 
successfully set himself up as a MitM, but can only read encrypted data from the 
connection.  Trial 3 is where the MitM effectively obtains the session keys.  This trial 
represents when a MitM has provided the client with a certificate that does not trip a 
warning.  In this way the attacker has hidden himself from the user and can now read the 
data from the connection in plaintext. 
 Each trial consists of 100 TLS connections from the client to the server.  This 
number is determined based upon the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem.   
The law of large numbers states that as a sample size increases the average of the results 
gets closer to the expected average value (Hoggs and Tanis, 2006:258).  Thus for a 
sufficiently large number of connections in each trial, the average should represent a 
close approximation to the expected average.  The central limit theorem is used to 
determine when a sample size is sufficiently large.  Generally the theorem notes that if 
the sample size is greater than 30, then it is considered to be sufficiently large (Hoggs and 
Tanis, 2006:292).   
 The data collected for this experiment is the completion time of the TLS 
handshake from each of these connections.  This time begins with the initial TCP SYN 
packet sent by the client and ends when the client sends the first application data packet.  
The TCP SYN packet was chosen as the starting point because it is the initial packet sent 
to the server by the client.  While this message is not considered a part of the TLS 
handshake, by starting the time with this packet the collected data encompasses the time 
the client takes to form and send the ClientHello.  Also since every connection begins 
with the TCP three-way handshake, adding the time to complete it does not skew the 
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data.  The time ends when the client sends the first application data packet.  By sending 
this message the client indicates that it has received the final message of the TLS 
handshake from the server and has verified all the information from it.  Ending the time 
with the application data packet guarantees that the time the client takes to verify the final 
finish message is incorporated into the collected data. 
 The time for each TLS handshake is collected using the network packet analyzer 
Wireshark.  Wireshark is a tool that displays the details of all the packets that the 
machine‟s Network Interface Card (NIC) sees.  This display shows each packet in the 
TLS connection, allowing for where the handshake begins and where it ends to be easily 
discernable.  Wireshark also adds a time stamp to each packet as it is captured.  The tool 
“gets the time stamps form the libcap (WinCap) library,” which supports microsecond 
resolution, and in turn gets the time stamps “from the operating system kernel” (Sharpe, 
2011).  
 Wireshark usually displays the time stamps as the time elapsed since the capture 
began.  Many options can be set to show different timing, but the most useful is the time 
toggle that can be placed on any packet.  This toggle sets the time stamp of that packet to 
zero and every packet afterwards shows the elapsed time since that toggled packet was 
received.  Therefore when collecting the data, a toggle can be set on each TCP SYN 
packet, handily providing the completion time of the TLS handshake without any 
extraneous calculations. 
 Finally, the data collection for this experiment occurs on the client machine.  The 
greatest motivation for collecting the data from the client is found by looking at the long 
term goal of this thesis.  The hope is that this thesis will provide the stepping stones to 
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one day create a defense mechanism against MitM attacks that will be place on client 
machines.  If some kind of alert can be created, it will base its warning off of the TLS 
handshake timing.  Thus the data of this experiment should reflect the timing that the 
client should see.  The results should not be in the perspective of the server or of a 
network node. 
 
3.3. Experiment Set-up 
 
 The implementation for this experiment requires a TCP/IP-enabled test 
environment consisting of three separate machines; the server, the client, and the MitM.  
For this experiment these machines are isolated on a separate network by themselves.  
Each machine is connected to a single switch as represented in Figure 7.  This isolated 
network allows for more control over the environment.  Any incidental factors, such as 
high network traffic and router outages, should be limited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Network Environment for the Experiment 
SWITCH 
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44 
 
 
The server machine must be able to run an SSL/TLS webpage that the client can 
connect to.  Apache is a free open source HTTP server that runs the webpage on the 
server machine.  Apache is chosen for this experiment because it is capable of SSL/TLS 
connections and it is freely available for download.  The software also comes with the 
source code which is useful in any possible debugging situations.  The operating system 
(OS) chosen for the server machine is Ubuntu 10.10.  The Ubuntu OS is readily available 
and allows for simpler manipulation of the Apache server than what is provided on a 
Windows machine.  Finally due to convenience, the server is set-up as a virtual machine 
using VMWare for this experiment.  The fact that the server is virtualized does not affect 
the results of this experiment since the data collection is done on the client machine. 
 The client machine needs to be able to connect to the server and access the secure 
webpage.  The client should not be virtualized because it is the machine that the data is 
collected from.  Since the data that is collected involves timing a virtualized machine can 
have unwanted effects on the data that easily be avoided.  The client OS must be able to 
run Wireshark for data collection and Visual Studio for the script that connects the client 
to the server.  The client script also uses a WebBrowser control, which is a Windows 
Forms that is a wrapper for Internet Explorer.  The dependability of the script requires the 
client OS to be Windows.  The OS used in this experiment is Windows 7, but any recent 
Windows OS will suffice.   
 The MitM machine must be able to execute all parts of the TLS protocol in order 
to successfully obtain the session keys.  An attacker needs some tool that gives him the 
flexibility to perform each step of the TLS handshake.  Scapy is an open source Python 
program that provides a myriad of capabilities by enabling “users to send, sniff and 
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dissect, and forge network packets” (Biondi, 2010:3).  This program provides many 
benefits to this experiment by combining many capabilities into one tool.  Thus Scapy is 
chosen as the base program to run the MitM scripts that are need.  A separate script is 
required for both Trial 2 and Trial 3.  More information about Scapy and why it was 
chosen for this experimentation can be found in Appendix D. 
 The OS for the MitM machine is Ubuntu 10.10.  This OS is chosen because of the 
compatibility of Scapy with Linux environments.  While Scapy is available for Windows, 
a user has more capabilities and a greater control over the Scapy functionality on Linux 
machines.  The MitM machine is not virtualized for this experiment, but it could be if 
needed since no data is calculated from this machine. 
 
3.4. Parameters and Factors 
 
 The parameters in this experiment encompass the entire network set-up.  For each 
trial the network configuration stays consistent in order to reduce any environmental 
factors that may arise. 
 This experiment comprises two separate variables.  The first variable is the TLS 
connection and the actions made on it.  The first trial runs the connection without any 
outside influence from a MitM.  Trial 2 runs the connection with a MitM as a proxy, but 
without any packet manipulation.  The final trial is the TLS connection with the MitM as 
a proxy performing packet manipulation in order to get the session keys.  The second 
variable in this experiment is the cipher suite used for each TLS connection.  Each trial is 
run four times, once for each of the cipher suites dealt with in this experiment.  The 
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cipher suites are chosen as a variable in order to determine if the choice of cipher suite 
affects the completion time of the TLS connection.  The four cipher suites used in this 
experiment are tls_rsa_with_aes_128_cbc_sha, tls_rsa_with_rc4_128_md5, 
tls_rsa_with_rc4_128_sha, and tls_rsa_with_3des_cbc_sha. 
 
 
3.5. Assumptions during Experimentation 
 
 Two different assumptions are made during the execution of this experiment.  The 
first assumption is that the MitM can successfully perform ARP cache poisoning.  In 
order for an attacker to be a MitM, he needs to redirect all the packets between the client 
and the server to his own MitM machine.  By sending out gratuitous ARP packets the 
MitM can make the client believe that the server‟s IP address is associated with the 
MitM‟s MAC address.  The attacker repeats this process with the server so that it believes 
the client‟s IP address is associated with the MitM‟s MAC address.  In this way all 
packets go first to the MitM where the MitM can make any changes he needs before 
forwarding the packets to the correct entity.  Executing the ARP poisoning is possible, 
but it is abstracted out for this experiment.  Instead static ARP entries are added to the 
client and server that mimics a successful ARP poisoning.  This abstraction guarantees 
that each connection made in Trials 2 and 3 are correctly directed to the MitM. 
 The second assumption made in this experiment is that the MitM can create an 
appropriate certificate, and he can plant the certificate on the client‟s machine.  Due to 
time constraints this experiment has the MitM forwarding the server‟s certificate on to 
the client without replacing it with his own certificate.  Since the server‟s private key is 
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known through the course of this experiment, the MitM can still perform the necessary 
calculations to obtain the pre-master secret.  While the MitM is not actually replacing the 
server‟s certificate, he still performs all necessary calculations as if he did send his own 
certificate to the client.  If a correctly crafted certificate can be created for the MitM, then 
it can replace the server‟s certificate and the script will perform exactly the same.  This 
simple substitution does not cause any errors or changes to the performance of the MitM. 
 
 
3.6. Data Representation and Statistical Analysis 
 
 The results of this experiment are presented graphically in two ways.  The first 
graph chosen is a basic scatter plot.  The x-axis represents the 100 TLS connections made 
in each trial.  The y-axis indicates the time in seconds the TLS handshake took to 
complete.  Each graph shows the results of multiple data sets at a time.  The scatter plot is 
chosen as the initial representation of the data because it allows for immediate 
observations of the results. 
 The second type of graph used is side-by-side box plots.  Box plots are used to 
graphically display the middle 50% of the collected data, the upper and lower 25% of the 
data, and any outliers (Ramsey and Schafer, 2002:17).  The box in these graphs 
represents the middle 50% of the data, with the horizontal line depicting the median.  The 
vertical lines, or the whiskers, show the upper and lower 25% of data within 1.5 box 
lengths of the box.  The dots on the graph represent any outliers that are within the scale 
of the graph.  Any outliers outside the scale of the y-axis, which represents the time of a 
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connection in seconds, are listed at the top of the graph above the corresponding trial.  
The box plot is used because it allows for a simple visual comparison between data sets. 
 After the graphs of the data are presented, a statistical summary of each trial is 
offered.  The first table after the graphs provides statistics on each individual trial.  The 
first value n is the sample size of the data, which is 100 for each trial.  The sample size is 
followed by the range of the collected data sets, indicating the minimum and maximum 
value.  Next comes the average TLS handshake completion time for each trial.  The final 
value in the table is the standard deviation, which represents the “typical distance 
between a single [data point] and the [trial‟s] average” (Ramsey and Schafer, 2002:21).  
The standard deviation is calculated as 
      (9) 
where Y1,…, Yn is the set of numbers in the sample,  is the average, and n is the sample 
size.  
 The second table begins the statistical comparison of each pair of trials.  The 
results are analyzed using t-distribution inference for two samples.  These calculations 
enable a conclusion to be made on whether or not the results of the trials are statistically 
different or not.  The first value given in this second table is the calculated difference 
between trials averages, which is calculated as follows: 
  (10) 
where  is the average of trial i and  is the average of trial j as found in the first results 
table.   
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The next value in the second results table is the pooled standard deviation 
calculated using the standard deviation of the two trials being compared.  The pooled 
standard deviation is calculated as follows: 
  (11) 
                          (12) 
where  is the sample size and  is the standard deviation for trial i and   is the sample 
size and  is the standard deviation for trial j.  These values can be found in the first 
results table.  
 The final column in the second results table is the standard error for differences.  
The standard error is “an estimate of the standard deviation in its sampling distribution” 
(Ramsey and Schafer, 2002:33).  This value is used later in determining if the data 
collected from the trials are statistically different.  The standard error for the difference of 
two averages is calculated as follows: 
        (13) 
where  is the calculated pooled standard deviation for trials i and j, and  is the sample 
size for trial i and   is the sample size for trial j. 
 The final table of the statistical summary contains the t-statistic and one-sided 
probability value, or p-value, for trials i and j.  This table holds the data the represents 
whether the trials are significantly different or not.  The t-statistic “tells how many 
standard errors [an] estimate is away from [a] hypothesized parameter” (Ramsey and 
Schafer, 2002:42).  For this experiment the estimate is the difference between trial 
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averages calculated in the first table, and the hypothesized value represents the believed 
difference of sample means.  The t-statistic is calculated as follows: 
                     (13) 
where  is the difference between averages as calculated in the first results table, 
 is the standard error for difference calculated in the second results table, and 
 is the hypothesized difference of sample means.  A null hypothesis assumes 
that the hypothesized value is zero.  In other words, a statistical difference does not exist 
between the trials that are being compared.  Thus the t-statistic can be recalculated as 
follows: 
    .      (14) 
The resulting value of the t-statistic represents how far away the estimated difference of 
trail averages is away from the hypothesized mean. 
 Once the t-statistic is calculated the p-value is determined, which is the last 
column in the final results table.  The p-value is defined as “the probability, under the 
null hypothesis, that the test statistic is equal to or exceeds the observed value of a test 
statistic in the direction of the alternate hypothesis” (Hogg and Tanis, 2006:473).  In 
other words, the evidence that the null hypothesis is incorrect increases as the p-value 
gets smaller.  Using the calculated t-statistic and the appropriate degree of freedom, a t-
distribution table can be consulted to determine the p-value.   
 Once a p-value is found the result can be used to conclude if the data collected 
points to the null hypothesis being true or not.  Generally, the smaller the p-value become 
the greater the probability that the null hypothesis of no statistical difference is incorrect.  
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For this experiment, the smaller the p-value is the more likely a statistical difference 
exists between the trials that are being compared.  The larger the p-value the more likely 
the data between the trials have no statistical difference.  Figure 8 represents how a p-
value size should be interpreted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Interpretation of the p-Value (Hogg and Tanis, 2006:47) 
 
 
 
The final two tables of the statistical summary should be read as follows.  The first 
column and the second row indicate the trial or cipher suite data that is being compared.  
The intersection of a certain column and row gives the result of the particular calculation 
based upon those two trials. 
 
3.7. Expected Results 
 
 The results of this experiment are expected to illustrate a statistical difference in 
connection times between each trial.  Trial 1 is the baseline and should take the least 
amount of time because changes are not made in how the TLS connection.  The packets 
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in this trial travel directly between the client and server.  Trial 2 should show a significant 
difference compared to Trial 1 because all of the packets are being routed through the 
MitM before arriving at their destination. The timing results between Trial 2 and Trial 3 
should show some variation as the MitM has to perform extra calculations because it is 
recreating TLS handshake packets to send to the client and server.  Whether this 
difference is significant will have to be determined by looking at the results of the 
experiment.  A statistical difference is expected to be observed between Trial 1 and Trial 
3 because the greatest change to the TLS connection occurs between these two trials.  
The observations from all of the trial comparisons should hopefully point to a time 
threshold that a client can use to determine if a MitM exists and if the MitM has access to 
the session keys. 
 Slight timing variations are expected to be observed between the trials with the 
use of different cipher suites.  These variations are expected to be minimal and show no 
significant difference.  While some algorithms in the cipher suites require more 
calculations and time to complete, the difference between the algorithms should not be 
observable.  
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
 
 
This chapter provides the results of the experiment described in Chapter III and is 
divided into three major sections.  The first portion presents the results in several groups, 
providing graphical representations of the data, a statistical summary, and analysis of the 
results.  The chapter then concludes with a discussion of the findings from this 
experiment.  
 
4.1. Results 
 
4.1.1. AES-128 CBC with SHA. 
 
 This first data group represents Trials 1, 2, and 3 executed with the TLS cipher 
suite tls_rsa_with_aes_128_cbc_sha.  Figure 9 provides a scatter plot of the data points 
for these trials.  Initial observations indicate a statistical difference between Trial 1 and 
the other two trials.  A comparison of the data between Trial 2 and Trial 3 has a less 
distinct variance, but a general observation can be made that the times in Trial 3 are 
greater than those from Trial 2. 
The next graph shown in Figure 10 has the box plots for the three trials.  This 
graph illustrates more distinctly the large variance between Trial 1 and the other two 
trials.  The box plots also provide a better visual comparison of Trials 2 and 3.  This 
graph shows that while the upper 25% of Trial 2 and the lower 25% of Trial 3 overlap, 
the middle 50% of the two data sets do not intersect.  While this graph shows a difference  
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Figure 9. Scatter Plot of TLS Handshake Times – AES-128 CBC with SHA 
 
 
 
between Trials 2 and 3, nothing conclusive can be determined at this point without a 
statistical analysis. 
 Tables 4, 5, and 6 provide the statistical summary of this group of data.  The p-
values in Table 6 show that comparing Trial 1 with Trial 2 and Trial 1 with Trial 3 results 
in a very small.  This small value means that the likelihood that the null hypothesis is 
incorrect is very high.  The p-value from the comparison of Trial 2 and Trial 3 is 0.08, 
which is very close to 1.  This large p-value means that the null hypothesis is highly 
probably for this comparison.  By these results one can conclude that the Trials 1 and 2 
and Trials 1 and 3 are statistically different while Trials 2 and 3 are not. 
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Figure 10. Box Plot – AES-128 CBC with SHA 
 
 
 
Table 4.    Statistical Results Table 1 for AES-128 CBC with SHA 
Trial n Range (s) Average (s) Standard Deviation 
1 100 0.005929 - 0.039392 0.016189 0.003504 
2 100 0.287941 – 2.79182 0.306481 0.248704 
3 100 0.300566 – 2.254541 0.373043 0.218020 
 
 
 
Table 5.    Statistical Results Table 2 for AES-128 CBC with SHA 
Trial Difference between Trial 
Averages 
Pooled Standard 
Deviation 
Standard Error for 
Differences 
 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 
1 0.290292 0.356854 0.249994 0.219158 0.035354 0.030994 
2  0.066562  0.332419  0.047011 
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Table 6.    Statistical Results Table 3 for AES-128 CBC with SHA 
Trial t-statistic for Null Hypothesis One-sided p-value 
 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 
1 8.210952 11.513648 << 0.001 <<< 0.001 
2  1.415881  0.08 
 
 
4.1.2. RC4-128 with MD5. 
 
 This group of data consists of Trials 1, 2, and 3 executed with the TLS cipher 
suite tls_rsa_with_rc4_128_md5.  Figure 11 is the scatter plot of these data sets.  Like the 
previous data group, a significant difference is seen between Trial 1 and the other two 
trials.  The graph for this group though shows the results of Trial 2 and Trial 3 to be very 
similar to one another.  No variation between the two trials can be seen in this graph. 
 Like the previous data group, the scatter plot shows a few outliers for Trial 2 and 
Trial 3.  These outliers are most likely due to the performance of the MitM machine.  
Unlike the other graph though, this scatter plot show more variation among the data 
points for Trial 1.  Ten time stamps for the TLS handshake are noticeable higher than the 
rest of the results, but these ten data points are comparable to each other.  In Wireshark 
the extra time delay for these points are noticed between when the server sends the 
acknowledgement of the ClientKeyExchange, ChangeCipherSpec, and encrypted 
Finished messages and when the server sends its own ChangeCipherSpec and encrypted 
Finish messages.  Between these messages the server is verifying the client‟s finished 
message and creating its own.  A delay may occur when the server machine is calculating 
the algorithms to perform this task. 
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Figure 11. TLS Handshake Times – RC4-128 with MD5 
 
 
 
 The next graph is the box plot for this data group, as seen in Figure 12.  An initial, 
visual observation from this graph would conclude that Trial 1 and 2 and Trial 1 and 3 
are significantly different, but that Trial 2 and Trial 3 are not.  The boxes for both Trial 2 
and Trial 3 are almost identical in placement, which means that the middle 50% of the 
data from these sets are within the same range. 
 Tables 7, 8, and 9 give the statistical summary of the data in this group.  Table 9 
gives the p-values for the data sets.  The p-values for the comparison of Trial 1 and 2 and 
Trial 1 and 3 are very small.  Thus a conclusion can be made that the results between 
these trials are statistically different.  The p-value for the comparison of Trial 2 and 3 is  
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Figure 12. Box Plot – RC4-128 with MD5 
 
 
 
Table 7.    Statistical Results Table 1 for RC4-128 with MD5 
Trial n Range (s) Average (s) Standard Deviation 
1 100 0.014385 – 0.063003 0.022552 0.012272 
2 100 0.282672 – 0.628100 0.311667 0.043240 
3 100 0.282164 – 0.573368 0.309632 0.031304 
 
 
 
Table 8.    Statistical Results Table 2 for RC4-128 with MD5 
Trial Difference between sample 
averages 
Pooled Standard 
Deviation 
Standard Error for 
differences 
 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 
1 0.289115 0.287080 0.045176 0.033795 0.006388 0.004779 
2  0.002035  0.053654  0.007588 
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Table 9.    Statistical Results Table 3 for RC4-128 with SHA 
Trial t-statistic for Null Hypothesis One-sided p-value 
 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 
1 45.259080 60.071145 <<<<< 0.001 <<<<< 0.001 
2  0.268187  0.395 
 
 
 
0.395, which is a very large number.  A conclusion can be made that the results between 
these two data sets are not significantly different. 
 
4.1.3 RC4-128 with SHA. 
 
 The data represented in this group are Trials 1, 2, and 3 executed with the TLS 
cipher suite tls_rsa_with_rc4_128_sha.  The first graph presented in Figure 13 is the 
scatter plot for this data series.  The scatter plot shows similar trends compared with the 
previous scatter plots from the other groups.  The results of Trial 1 are significantly less 
than those of Trial 2 and Trial 3.  The data from Trial 2 and Trial 3 are very similar, but 
the results from Trial 3 are observably larger than those of Trial 2.  Outliers for Trial 2 
and Trial 3 are minimal in this graph.  The outliers for Trial 1 follow the same trend as 
seen in the scatter plot for the trials executed with RC4-128 with MD5. 
 The next graph presented is the box plots of the data found in Figure 14.  The box 
pot of Trial 1 is obviously different from the box plots of Trial 2 and 3.  The box plots of 
Trial 2 and 3 show some variance, but are very close in location.  The entire box of Trial 
3 overlaps with the upper whisker of Trial 2.  This intersection means that 50% of the 
data from Trial 3 lies in the same range as the upper 25% of the data from Trial 2. 
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Figure 13. TLS Handshake Times – RC4-128 with SHA 
 
 
 
 Tables 10, 11, and 12 are statistical summaries of the data sets in this group.  
Table 12 contains the p-values of the trial comparisons.  The three p-values in this table 
are all less than 0.001.  The conclusion made from this analysis is that all the trials are 
statistically different from each other.  This data group is the first to show a statistical 
difference between Trials 2 and 3. 
  
4.1.4. 3DES CBC with SHA. 
 
 The data represented in this group are Trials 1, 2, and 3 executed with the TLS 
cipher suite tls_rsa_with_3des_cbc_sha.  Figure 14 is the scatter plot for this data series.   
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Figure 14. Box Plot – RC4-128 with SHA 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.    Statistical Results Table 1 for RC4-128 with SHA 
Trial n Range (s) Average (s) Standard Deviation 
1 100 0.012953 – 0.064075 0.022609 0.010416 
2 100 0.248589 – 0.443749 0.273708 0.023090 
3 100 0.283651 – 0.572478 0.307269 0.031650 
 
 
 
Table 11.    Statistical Results Table 2 for RC4-128 with SHA 
Trial Difference between sample averages Pooled SD SE for differences 
 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 
1 0.251099 0.284660 0.025460 0.033489 0.003601 0.004736 
2  0.033561  0.039377  0.005569 
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Table 12.    Statistical Results Table 3 for RC4-128 with SHA 
Trial t-statistic for Null Hypothesis One-sided p-value 
 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 
1 69.730353 60.105574 <<<<< 0.001 <<<<< 0.001 
2  6.026396  << 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. TLS Handshake Times – 3DES with SHA 
 
 
 
Visual observation concludes that Trial 1 is significantly different from Trial 2 and 3.  
The data from Trial 2 and 3 show a similar trend with the data from Trial 3 being slightly 
higher than those from Trial 2. 
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 Outliers are minimal on this graph for Trials 2 and 3 and show similar tendencies 
as compared with the previous scatter plots.  The data results from Trial 1 also show a 
similar pattern with a few points being noticeable higher than the rest, but comparable to 
each other.  This scatter plot though shows one major outlier from Trial 1 that has not 
been seen previously.  Upon investigation into the raw Wireshark capture, the delay is 
noticed at the same point in the TLS handshake as the other minor outliers.  A larger 
elapsed time is visible between when the server sends the acknowledgement of the 
ClientKeyExchange, ChangeCipherSpec, and encrypted Finished messages and when the 
server sends his own ChangeCipherSpec and encrypted Finished messages.   
 The box plots for this data series can be found in Figure 15.  As previously noted 
in other box plots, Trial 1 is observably different from those of Trial 2 and 3.  The box 
plots for Trial 2 and 3 in this graph show a slightly greater variation as compared to the 
previous box plot.  The actual boxes for these trials do not overlap.  The upper whisker 
for Trial 2 lands about halfway between the box for Trial 3.  Thus an observation can be 
made that a difference between the trials are seen, but statistical analysis is needed to 
determine if they are significantly different. 
 The statistical summary for this data series can be found in Table 13, 14, and 15, 
with the p-values in Table 15.  The p-values for the trial comparisons are all less than 
0.001.  These small p-values can lead to the conclusion that the trials run using 3DES 
with SHA are all statistically different.  This data group is the second of the four that 
shows a statistical difference between Trial 2 and 3. 
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Figure 16. Box Plot – 3DES with SHA 
 
 
 
Table 13.    Statistical Results Table 1 for 3DES with SHA 
Trial n Range (s) Average (s) Standard Deviation 
1 100 0.015271 -0.523500 0.028015 0.051279 
2 100 0.249670 – 0.441234 0.273330 0.023713 
3 100 0.282544 – 0.549208 0.309363 0.033333 
 
 
Table 14.    Statistical Results Table 2 for 3DES with SHA 
Trial Difference between 
sample averages 
Pooled Standard 
Deviation 
Standard Error for 
differences 
 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 
1 0.245315 0.281348 0.056184 0.061472 0.007946 0.008693 
2  0.036033  0.041115  0.005815 
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Table 15.    Statistical Results Table 3 for 3DES with SHA 
Trial t-statistic if no difference in times One-sided p-value 
 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 
1 30.872766 32.364891 <<<<< 0.001 <<<<< 0.001 
2  6.196561  << 0.001 
 
 
 
4.1.5. Comparison of Trial 1. 
 
 This next comparison of data looks at Trial 1 across the four different cipher 
suites.  This section, along with the two following, is used to determine if a statistical 
difference is incurred based on the use of different cipher suites.  The scatter plot of all 
Trial 1s is found in Figure 17.  A visual inspection of this graph shows all the data points 
for each cipher suite to be generally the same.  Three of the four data sets have the same 
minimal outliers with the trial run with 3DES having one major outlier. 
 Figure 18 is the box plots of all the Trial 1s.  An observation based upon this 
graph can be made that the results from each data set are very similar.  Visually the 
results from the cipher suite with AES-128 seem to be slightly lower than the rest of the 
box plots.  The middle 50% box for the AES-128 data does not overlap with the boxes 
from any other Trial 1, but the upper whisker lies in the same range as the rest of the 
boxes.  The middle 50% ranges for the other three Trial 1s are nearly identical.   
 Tables 16, 17 and 18 represent the statistical summary of all Trial 1s.  Table 18 
contains the p-values for the comparisons of the different trials.  The p-value between the 
cipher suite using AES-128 and the cipher suites using RC4-128 are very small.  The low 
values strongly imply that the data between these trials are statistically different.  The p-
value between the cipher suite using AES-128 and 3DES is 0.054.  While this value is 
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Figure 17. TLS Handshake Times – Trial 1 
 
 
 
small enough to suggest that the data sets might be different, the value cannot be used to 
make a conclusive decision on the data.  The p-values for the rest of the trial comparisons 
are very large, which means that these data sets are not statistically different from one 
another. 
 
4.2.6. Comparison of Trial 2. 
 
 The data sets compared in this section are all Trial 2s executed with the different 
cipher suites.  The scatter plot for these trials is in Figure 19.  A visual observation of this 
graph can conclude that all the data sets are similar to each other.  Only one major outlier 
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Figure 18. Box Plot for Trial 1 across all Cipher Suites 
 
 
 
Table 16.    Statistical Results Table 1 for No MitM Action across Cipher Suites 
Cipher Suite n Range (s) Average (s) Standard 
Deviation 
AES-128 CBC with SHA 100 0.005929 - 0.039392 0.016189 0.003504 
RC4-128 with MD5 100 0.014385 – 0.063003 0.022552 0.012272 
RC4-128 with SHA 100 0.012953 – 0.064075 0.022609 0.010416 
3DES with SHA 100 0.015271 -0.523500 0.028015 0.051279 
 
 
exists for Trial 2 run with the AES-128 cipher suite.  Figure 20 is the side-by-side 
comparison of the box plots for these trials.  Unlike the scatter plot, this graph illustrates 
the variance between the data sets.  The results from the trial run with 3DES is observed   
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Table 17.    Statistical Results Table 2 for No MitM Action across Cipher Suites 
Cipher 
Suite 
Difference between sample 
averages 
Pooled Standard Deviation 
 RC4-128 
/MD5 
RC4-128 
/SHA 
3DES 
/SHA 
RC4-128 
/MD5 
RC4-128 
/SHA 
3DES 
/SHA 
AES/SHA 0.006360 0.006420 0.011826 0.012827 0.011046 0.051657 
RC4/MD5  0.000057 0.005463  0.016178 0.052992 
RC428/SHA   0.005406   0.052590 
 Standard Error for differences 
AES/SHA 0.001814 0.001562 0.007305 
RC4/MD5  0.002288 0.007494 
RC4/SHA   0.007437 
 
 
 
Table 18.    Statistical Results Table 3 for No MitM Action across Cipher Suites 
Cipher 
Suite 
t-statistic for Null Hypothesis One-sided p-value 
 RC4/MD5 RC4/SHA 3DES/SHA RC4/MD5 RC4/SHA 3DES/SHA 
AES/SHA 3.506064 4.110115 1.618891 0.0003 < 0.001 0.054 
RC4/D5  0.024913 0.728983  0.490 0.234 
RC4/SHA   0.726906   0.236 
 
 
 
to be the data set with the smallest time values followed by the results from the trial with 
AES.  The two trials using the RC4 cipher are visually similar based upon the box plots. 
 The statistical summary for these data series is found in Table 19, 20, and 21 with 
the p-values in Table 21.  Only the p-values for the comparisons of the two RC4 ciphers 
and the comparison of the RC4 with MD5 and 3DES cipher suites are small enough to 
suggest that these data results are statistically different.  The remaining p-values are all 
very large, which leads to the conclusion that the rest of the data sets have no significant 
difference when compared to each other. 
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Figure 19. TLS Handshake Times – Trial 2 
 
 
4.2.7. Comparison of Trial 3. 
 
 This section looks at the results of all Trial 3s from the four different cipher 
suites.  The scatter plot for these data sets is in Figure 21.  The scatter plot reveals that the 
results are nearly identical across the different instances of Trial 3.  The only variation 
seen between the trials is that the trial using AES-128 has more outliers than the others.  
These outliers might be seen with one cipher suite and not the others because the MitM 
machine at times may have required more computations to encrypt using one cipher 
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Figure 20. Box Plot – Trial 2 
 
 
 
Table 19.    Statistical Results Table 1 for a Passive MitM across Cipher Suites 
Cipher Suite n Range (s) Average 
(s) 
Standard 
Deviation 
AES-128 CBC with SHA 100 0.287941 – 2.79182 0.306481 0.248704 
RC4-128 with MD5 100 0.282672 – 0.628100 0.311667 0.043240 
RC4-128 with SHA 100 0.248589 – 0.443749 0.273708 0.023090 
3DES with SHA 100 0.249670 – 0.441234 0.273330 0.023713 
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Table 20.    Statistical Results Table 2 for a Passive MitM across Cipher Suites 
Cipher 
Suite 
Difference between sample 
averages 
Pooled Standard Deviation 
 RC4-128 
/MD5 
RC4-128 
/SHA 
3DES 
/SHA 
RC4-128 
/MD5 
RC4-128 
/SHA 
3DES 
/SHA 
AES/SHA 0.004886 0.033773 0.033151 0.23720 0.251045 0.251103 
RC4/MD5  0.037959 0.038337  0.049268 0.049566 
RC428/SHA   0.000378   0.033266 
 Standard Error for differences 
AES/SHA 0.033545 0.035503 0.035511 
RC4/MD5  0.006968 0.007010 
RC4/SHA   0.004705 
 
 
 
Table 21.    Statistical Results Table 3 for a Passive MitM across Cipher Suites 
Cipher 
Suite 
t-statistic for Null Hypothesis One-sided p-value 
 RC4/MD5 RC4/SHA 3DES/SHA RC4/MD5 RC4/SHA 3DES/SHA 
AES/SHA 0.145655 0.951271 0.933541 0.442 0.172 0.173 
RC4/D5  5.447618 5.468902  < 0.001 < 0.001 
RC4/SHA   0.080340   0.468 
 
 
 
compared to another.  These outliers can also indicate that some interference occurred 
when the Trial 3 was run with AES-128 that did not manifest with the other trials. 
 The side-by-side box plots for the four Trial 3s are in Figure 22.  The observation 
made from the box plots is that the trial executed with AES-128 produced larger data 
values than the other three trials.  The box plot most likely reflects the outliers seen in the 
scatter plot.  The other three Trial 3s using the two RC4 ciphers and the 3DES cipher 
seem nearly identical.  The middle 50% represented by the boxes for these trials have 
very similar data ranges.  Thus a conclusion based on the box plots is that the trial 
executed with AES may be statistically different from the others while no difference is 
seen in the remaining three trials. 
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Figure 21. TLS Handshake Times – Trial 3 
 
 
 
 The statistical summary of the four Trial 3s is found in Tables 22, 23, and 24 with 
the p-values residing in Table 24.  The p-values comparing the trial using AES-128 with 
the other three trials are 0.024, 0.019, and 0.023.  The interpretation for these values is 
that the probability that the null hypothesis of no difference is incorrect is moderate but 
not convincing.  Thus while these values highly suggest that the data series are different, 
they are not small enough to give a persuasive conclusion.  The p-values comparing the 
final three cipher suites are very large, which indicates that these results are not 
statistically different.  
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Figure 22. Box Plot – Trial 3 
 
 
 
Table 22.    Statistical Results Table 1 for an Active MitM across Cipher Suites 
Cipher Suite n Range (s) Average (s) Standard 
Deviation 
AES-128 CBC with SHA 100 0.300566 – 2.254541 0.373043 0.218020 
RC4-128 with MD5 100 0.282164 – 0.573368 0.309632 0.031304 
RC4-128 with SHA 100 0.283651 – 0.572478 0.307269 0.031650 
3DES with SHA 100 0.282544 – 0.549208 0.309363 0.033333 
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Table 23.    Statistical Results Table 2 for an Active MitM across Cipher Suites 
Cipher 
Suite 
Difference between sample 
averages 
Pooled Standard Deviation 
 RC4-128 
/MD5 
RC4-128 
/SHA 
3DES 
/SHA 
RC4-128 
/MD5 
RC4-128 
/SHA 
3DES 
/SHA 
AES/SHA 0.063411 0.065774 0.063680 0.221377 0.221426 0.221676 
RC4/MD5  0.002363 0.000269  0.044742 0.045960 
RC428/SHA   0.002094   0.046199 
 Standard Error for differences 
AES/SHA 0.031307 0.031313 0.031350 
RC4/MD5  0.006327 0.006500 
RC4/SHA   0.006534 
 
 
 
Table 24.    Statistical Results Table 3 for an Active MitM across Cipher Suites 
Cipher 
Suite 
t-statistic for Null Hypothesis One-sided p-value 
 RC4/MD5 RC4/SHA 3DES/SHA RC4/MD5 RC4/SHA 3DES/SHA 
AES/SHA 2.005458 2.100533 2.031260 0.024 0.019 0.023 
RC4/D5  0.373479 0.041385  0.355 0.484 
RC4/SHA   0.320478   0.375 
 
 
4.2. Result Findings 
 
 This discussion on the findings of this experiment begins with the comparisons of 
Trials 1, 2, and 3.  For each cipher suite used Trial 1 was found to be statistically 
different from Trials 2 and 3.  For the trials using RC4-128 with SHA and 3DES CBC 
with SHA, the p-values provide a convincing argument that the results from Trials 2 and 
3 are significantly different.  The p-values comparing Trials 2 and 3 using AES-128 with 
SHA and RC4-128 with MD5 though suggests a high probability that no statistical 
difference is evident between the trials. 
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 A number of conclusions can be drawn from these results.  The first conclusion is 
that no matter if a MitM is reading encrypted data or plaintext from a TLS connection, 
his presence can be detectable based upon the timing of the TLS handshake.  The results 
of Trial 1 do showcase few outliers, but in general if a TLS handshake takes a significant 
amount of time longer than average the probability that a MitM is on the connection is 
very high.  The results can point to a timing threshold that the client can use to monitor 
the TLS handshake and close the connection when it suspects that a MitM is present.  In 
this way a client machine would be able to prevent any more data loss to a MitM that 
would have been exchanged during the application data portion of the TLS connection.  
Further study needs to be conducted to find the exact value of this threshold and to 
determine what other network factors could cause this same type of delay. 
 The second conclusion that can be drawn from only these findings is that whether 
the client is able to detect if a MitM has obtained the session keys or not is inconclusive.  
A statistical difference was noticed between Trials 2 and 3 using the cipher suites RC4-
128 with SHA and 3DES CBC with SHA.  This result suggests that a timing threshold to 
determine an active MitM compared to a passive MitM may be possible.  By taking into 
consideration that Trials 2 and 3 showed no statistical difference for the cipher suites 
AES-128 CBC with SHA and RC4-128 with MD5 makes the possibility of finding this 
threshold undeterminable.  The question that arises with these results is determining what 
factors caused a variation between the cipher suites.  If the use of any one of the four 
cipher suites used in this experiment is shown to have no effect on the resulting data, then 
further study needs to be conducted to determine what is causing the variation in the 
observed results.  
76 
 
 
 The next part of this discussion analyzes the comparison results between each 
cipher suite.  As seen by the findings of the trial comparisons, these results can help to 
conclude if a timing threshold to determine an active MitM can be established.  Again, if 
no statistical difference is found between the different uses of the cipher suites, then the 
cipher suites do not affect the timing results of the TLS handshake.  Looking at the 
results for the baseline, the data from Trial 1 with AES-128 CBC with SHA is 
significantly different compared to the Trial 1 from the other cipher suites.  This finding 
suggests that using the AES-128 CBC with SHA may affect the timing results, where the 
other cipher suites do not.  If this statement is true then this trend should be seen with the 
use of AES-128 CBC with SHA in Trials 2 and 3. 
 When inspecting the findings comparing the results of Trial 2 though, only the use 
of the cipher RC4-128 with MD5 is seen to have a statistical difference from the use of 
the cipher suites RC4-128 with SHA and 3DES CBC with SHA.  This result was not seen 
in the findings of Trial 1, which would indicate that RC4-128 with MD5 affects the 
outcome of the TLS handshake timing.  Since this variance is first seen in Trial 2, a look 
at the results of Trial 3 is needed to determine if the cipher suite or another factor is 
resulting in the discrepancy.     
 For Trial 2, the AES-128 CBC with SHA cipher suite no longer shows any 
statistical difference when compared with the other cipher suites.  If this cipher suite was 
affecting the results of the TLS handshake, the statistical difference should have been 
carried over from Trial 1 into Trial 2.  Since this variation is no longer evident, this 
finding points to some other factor that may be altering the outcome of the data. 
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 Looking at the results for Trial 3 shows that a moderately high probability exists 
that using the AES-128 CBC with SHA cipher suite results in significantly different data 
compared with the other cipher suites.  This probability is not as conclusive as that seen 
in Trial 1, but lends to the tendency that the AES-128 cipher affects the TLS timing 
results.  If this theory is correct though, this same difference should have been seen in 
Trial 2.  Further study needs to be conducted to determine what is causing the AES-128 
CBC with SHA to be statistically different in Trials 1 and 3 but not Trial 2.  Some 
unknown factor could be playing a role in these findings, but that factor is 
undeterminable at this time. 
 The rest of the cipher suites used in Trial 3 are seen as having no statistical 
difference from one another.  This finding shows the anomaly seen with the RC4-128 
with MD5 cipher suite in Trial 2.  If the same statistical difference seen in Trial 2 carried 
over into Trial 3, then a conclusion can be made that the performance of the MitM 
machine with this cipher suite is causing the difference in results.  Since the RC4-128 
with MD5 has not statistical difference when compared with RC4-128 with SHA and 
3DES CBC with SHA, then some other factor must be influencing the results in Trial 2.  
Further study is needed to determine the nature of this factor. 
 The only two cipher suites that showed no statistical difference between each 
other through all three trials are the RC4-128 with SHA and 3DES CBC with SHA cipher 
suites.  This finding can be used with those in the first part of this discussion to conclude 
that a timing threshold may actually be possible to establish.  From the first part of this 
section, the results showed that Trials 2 and 3 were not statistically different when using 
the two above cipher suites.  Since no statistical difference could be found in whether the 
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RC4-128 with SHA or 3DES CBC with SHA cipher suite was used, then the previous 
result seen between Trials 2 and 3 can be attributed to the manipulations the MitM is 
performing on the packets.  This finding lends credit to the theory that a constant timing 
threshold to detect when a MitM has obtained the TLS session keys may be calculable.  
Since this result could not be concluded for the use of all cipher suites, further study is 
needed in order to conclusively assert this theory. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
5.1. Conclusions 
 
 The Transport Layer Security protocol is a vital component to the protection of 
data as it traverses across networks.  Protecting sensitive data from Man-in-the-Middle 
attacks is imperative to keeping the information secure.  This thesis illustrates how an 
attacker can successfully perform a MitM attack against a TLS connection without 
alerting the user to his activities.  By deceiving the client machine into using a false 
certificate, an attacker takes away the only active defense mechanism a user has against a 
MitM.  The goal for this research is to determine if a time threshold exists that can 
indicate the presence of a MitM in this scenario.  Any conclusive finding supporting the 
existence of a timing baseline can be considered the first steps toward finding the value 
of the threshold and creating a second layer defense to actively protect against a MitM. 
 The experiment for this thesis involves comparing the TLS handshake completion 
times from three different trials.  Trial 1 is considered the baseline where a clear TLS 
connection is made without any MitM manipulation.  Trial 2 adds the MitM as a proxy 
between the client and the server.  The MitM in this trial is forwarding the packets 
without making any alterations to them.  The final trial, Trial 3, has the MitM as a proxy 
between the client and the server where he is manipulating packets in order to obtain the 
session keys.  The results from these trials are used to determine if a client can potentially 
differentiate between a clean TLS connection and a connection with a MitM and whether 
or not the client can differentiate between an active and a passive MitM. 
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 Each of the three trials is run four different times, once for each cipher suite used 
in this experiment.  The four cipher suites are tls_rsa_with_rc4_128_md5, 
tls_rsa_with_rc4_128_sha, tls_rsa_with_aes-128_cbc_sha, and 
tls_rsa_with_3des_cbc_sha.  A comparison of the cipher suites is used to determine if the 
results collected are influenced differently based upon the chosen cipher suite.  No 
statistical difference between the cipher suites means that any statistical difference found 
between the three trials is most likely influenced by the MitM‟s involvement in the TLS 
connection. 
 The results from each trial were collected and compared to determine if the data 
sets can be considered statistically different.  Table 25 gives a high level account of the 
comparison of the results between the three trials.  Table 26 gives the high level account 
of the comparison of the results between the cipher suites. 
 
 
Table 25.    Results of Comparisons between Different MitM Involvment Indicating 
Probability of Statistical Difference 
Trial AES-128/SHA RC4-128/MD5 RC4-128/SHA 3DES/SHA 
 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 2 Trial 3 
1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2  N  N  Y  Y 
(Y=Yes, N=No) 
 
 
 
 The first conclusion that can be made based upon the results is that a threshold 
can be calculated that will indicate the probability that a TLS connection is clean and 
when a MitM is present.  This finding is based on the result that Trial 1 is statistically   
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Table 26.    Results of Comparisons between Cipher Suites Indicating Probability of 
Statistical Difference 
Cipher 
Suite 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 
 RC4 
/MD5 
RC4 
/SHA 
3DES 
/SHA 
RC4 
/MD5 
RC4 
/SHA 
3DES 
/SHA 
RC4 
/MD5 
RC4 
/SHA 
3DES 
/SHA 
AES 
/SHA 
Y Y S N N N M M M 
RC4 
/MD5 
 N N  Y Y  N N 
RC4 
/SHA 
  N   N   N 
(Y=Yes, N=No, S=Suggestive, M=Moderate) 
 
 
 
different from Trials 2 and 3 for all cipher suites.  This result does not specify if a 
threshold can be calculated that can determine if the MitM is active or passive. 
 The second conclusion is that a threshold to differentiate between an active and a 
passive MitM likely exists, but further study needs to be conducted to find anything 
conclusive.  Only half of the cipher suites had the results of Trial 2 and 3 as statistically 
different.  When reviewing the comparisons of the cipher suites, these same two cipher 
suites were not statistically different for any trial.  By the results from these two cipher 
suites alone a conclusion can be made that a threshold is determinable.  The fact that no 
statistical difference was recorded between the two cipher suites indicates a high 
probability that the statistical difference observed between their Trials 2 and 3 is due to 
the MitM. 
 When consulting the results from using the cipher suite AES-128 and RC4-128 
with MD5, the conclusion that a threshold to determine an active versus a passive MitM 
weakens.  The comparisons of Trials 2 and 3 for these results show now statistical 
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difference.  The comparisons of the cipher suites themselves show intermittent statistical 
differences across the three trials.  To conclude that the results are statistically different 
due to the use of a cipher suite requires a statistical difference between cipher suites in all 
three trials.  This trend is not seen with either of these two cipher suites.  Thus a 
conclusion can be made that some other environmental factor may have caused the 
observed results. 
 Two final conclusions can be made for this experiment.  The first is that a 
threshold can be calculated in order to determine the presence of a MitM.  This result 
means that a client can potentially use the threshold value to determine the likelihood of a 
MitM no matter if he is reading encrypted data or plaintext.  The second conclusion is 
that while a calculable threshold to differentiate between an active and a passive MitM 
seems likely, further study needs to be conducted to strengthen this deduction. 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
 
 This experiment is thought of as a building block for further study and 
experimentation.  In that light, recommendations for future work are made, some based 
on limitations and findings from this experiment and the other based on how the 
experiment can be expanded. 
1. Repeat experimentation to collect more data 
This experiment only executed Trials 1, 2, and 3 once for each cipher suite.  
This small amount of data proved to be a limitation to the analysis of the 
results.  If the experiment can be repeated running each trial multiple times 
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per cipher suite, stronger conclusions can be made.  More data points might 
have allowed for an explanation of the unexpected results from this 
experiment.  More data could also lead to the discovery that a cipher suite is 
or an unknown environmental factor is affecting the results. 
2. Analyze more cipher suites 
This experiment only focused on four out of the many possible TLS cipher 
suites that can be used.  While this thesis is a great starting point, an analysis 
of all possible cipher suites is needed in order to make a conclusion on 
whether each cipher suites affect the results differently.  Once this conclusion 
can be made, whether a separate threshold value for each cipher suite or a 
constant threshold value is required can be determined. 
3. Determine environmental factors on isolated network 
This experiment was conducted on an isolated network with only three 
machines and a switch.  A limitation of this experiment is the assumption that 
this isolated network meant that the environmental factors were very minimal 
and would not affect the resulting data.  This experiment can be improved if 
all the environmental factors on this isolated network and their influence on 
the data can be determined. 
4. Add network variability 
As mentioned in the previous recommendation, this experiment was 
conducted on an isolated network containing three machines and a switch.  
Once all the environmental factors can be determined for the isolated network 
the next step would be to add more environmental factors that are seen 
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normally on a live network.  These factors can include the level of network 
traffic and the distance between nodes.  The effect of these new factors on the 
TLS connections needs to be studied as well. 
5. Determine the threshold value 
This experiment only asks the question of whether or not the threshold to 
determine a MitM exists.  Calculating the value of this threshold is outside the 
scope of this experiment and is left for future work.  Once this value is 
calculated, it can be used in further experimentation and study. 
6. Determine the probability that timing delay is due to a MitM 
Once a threshold value can be determined the next step is to calculate the 
probability that a connection time higher than the threshold is actually caused 
by a MitM and not an environmental factor.  If the probability that a MitM 
causes a time delay above the threshold is only 50% the any defense 
mechanism based of this threshold will have a lot of false positives.  This 
probability needs to be determined to know if the threshold value might have 
any useful application 
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Appendix A: TLS Protocol Error Alert Types 
 
 
Parameters Definitions 
unexpected_error An inappropriate message was received.  This alert is always 
fatal and should never be observed in communication 
between proper implementations. 
bad_record_mac This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect 
MAC.  This alert also must be returned if an alert is sent 
because a TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way.  This 
message is always fatal and should never be observed in 
communication between proper implementation. 
decryption_failed This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS, and may 
have permitted certain attacks against the CBC mode.  It 
must not be sent by compliant implementations. 
record_overflow A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more 
than 2^14 + 2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a 
TLSCompressed record with more than 2^14 + 1024 bytes.  
This message is always fatal and should never be observed in 
communication between proper implementations. 
decompression_failure The decompression function received improper input.  This 
message is always fatal and should never be observed in 
communication between proper implementations. 
handshake_failure Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that 
the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of 
security parameters given the option available.  This is a fatal 
error. 
no_certificate_ This alert was used in SSLv3 but not any versions of TLS.  It 
must not be sent by compliant implementations. 
bad_certificate A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not 
verify correctly, etc. 
unsupported_certificate A certificate was of an unsupported type. 
certificate_revoked A certificate was revoked by its signer. 
certificate_expired A certificate has expired or is not currently valid. 
certificate_unknown Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the 
certificate, rendering it unacceptable. 
illegal_parameter A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent 
with other fields.  This message is always fatal. 
unknown_ca A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the 
certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could 
not be located or could not be matched with a known, trusted 
CA.  This message is always fatal. 
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access_denied A valid certificate was received, but when access control was 
applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation.  
This message is always fatal. 
decode_error A message could not be decoded because some field was out 
of the specified range or the length of the message was 
incorrect.  This message is always fatal and should never be 
observed in communication between proper implementations. 
decrypt_error A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being 
unable to correctly verify a signature or validate a Finished 
message.  This message is always fatal. 
export_restriction_ 
RESERVED 
This alert was used in some earlier version of TLS.  It must 
not be sent by compliant implementations. 
protocol_version The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is 
recognized but not supported.  This message is always fatal. 
insufficient_security Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation 
has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers 
more secure than those supported by the client.  This message 
is always fatal. 
internal_error An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of 
the protocol makes it impossible to continue.  This message 
is always fatal. 
user_cancelled This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated 
to a protocol failure.  If the user cancels an operation after the 
handshake is complete, just closing the connection by 
sending a close_notify is more appropriate.  This alert should 
be followed by a close_notify.  This message is generally a 
warning. 
no_renegotiation Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the 
server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking.  
Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when 
that is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this 
alert.  At that point, the original requester can decide whether 
to proceed with the connection.  This message is always a 
warning. 
unsupported_extensions Sent by the clients that receive an extended server hello 
containing an extension that they did not put in the 
corresponding client hello.  This message is always fatal. 
(Dierks and Rescorla, 2008:30-33)  
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Appendix B: Additional Background Information 
 
RC4 
Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) was created by Ron Rivest in 1987 and is an example of a 
stream cipher (Stamp and Low, 2007:103).  The algorithm for RC4 is proprietary, but in 
1994 an anonymous source reverse-engineered the algorithm and published what was the 
believed specifications.  The published algorithm has not officially been standardized, but 
can still be found in use today in protocols such as the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) (Stamp 
and Low, 2007:103). 
 
DES 
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is an example of a block cipher.  This 
algorithm uses portions of a 64-bit key to encrypt a block of data.  The 64-bit result is 
concatenated to the end of the previous result to create a full ciphertext.  Since its 
creation, many weaknesses have been found in DES, and because of this the DES 
algorithm has been updated with Triple DES (3DES).  This method runs each data block 
through the algorithm three times using different part of the encryption key for each pass. 
 
AES 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is another example of a block cipher.  
Even though 3DES is more secure than DES alone, weaknesses still riddled the algorithm 
prompting the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to search for a 
replacement in 1997 (Trappe and others, 2006:151).  AES was the result of that search. 
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Unlike DES, AES keys could vary between 128, 192, and 256 bits in length, and the 
output for the algorithm is a 128 bit block. 
 
SHA 
 SHA was originally developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and 
published in 1993 as a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) (Trappe and 
others, 2006:224).  Weaknesses found in SHA lead to an updated version named SHA-1, 
which was published in 1995 (Trappe and others, 2006:224).  The SHA-1 algorithm can 
be found described in detail in the figure below.  In short, the algorithm takes the input 
data and breaks it into blocks.  Each block is passed through a function using the result of 
the previous block as extra input, with the first block being processed using initial values 
standardized in the algorithm.  The final output of the hash results in a 160-bit message 
digest.  SHA-1 alone only provides for 80 bits of security, thus the SHA-256, SHA-384, 
and SHA-512 algorithms were added to the family (NIST, 1993).   
 
MD5 
 The MD family began with the MD2 algorithm since the first MD function was 
never published (Trappe and others, 2006:224).  The MD4 algorithm, created by Ron 
Rivest, was soon to follow (Stamp and Low, 2007:225).  Weakness became evident in 
both of these algorithms, prompting Rivest to publish the MD5 algorithm.  MD5 is the 
most commonly used algorithm of the MD family and was designed as an improvement 
to MD4.  The algorithm functions similarly to the SHA-1 algorithm.  The data to be 
hashed is broken into 16-word blocks.  
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The SHA-1 Algorithm 
1. Start with a message m.  Append bits (padding) to obtain a message y of the form y = 
m1||m2||…||mL, where each mi has 512 bits. 
2.  Initialize H0 = 67452301, H1 = efcdab89, H2 = 98badcfe, H3 = 10325476, H4 = 
c3d2e1f0 
3.   For i = 0 to L – 1, do the following: 
(a)  Write mi = W0||W1||…||W15, where each Wj has 32 bits 
(b)  For t = 16 to 79, let Wt = (Wt-3          Wt-8      Wt-14      Wt-16) << 1 
(c)  Let A = H0, B = H1, C = H2, D = H3, E = H4 
(d)  For t = 0 to 79, do the following steps in succession: 
 T = (A << 5) + ft(B, C, D) + E +  Wt + Kt 
 E = D 
 D = C 
 C = (B << 30) 
 B  = A 
 A  = T 
(e)  Let H0 = H0 + A, H1 = H1 + B, H2 = H2 + C, H3 = H3 + D, H4 = H4 +  E 
4.  Output H0||H1||H2||H3||H4 – This is the 160-bit hash value 
SHA-1 Algorithm (Trappe and others, 2006:226) 
 
 
An initial block is defined and used to process the first block of data through an algorithm 
consisting of 4 Rounds (Rivest, 1992).  The result of the first block is then used to 
compute the second block.  This process continues until all blocks are processed, 
producing a 128-bit message digest (Rivest, 1992).  The figure below depicts the MD5 
algorithm in pseudo code.  For more information about the MD5 hash, refer to (Rivest, 
1992).  Today, the MD5 algorithm is considered to be broken (Stamp and Low, 
2007:225).  While some life remains in the algorithm, it should be phased out of any 
implementation needing a hash algorithm. 
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MD5 Algorithm 
// M = (Y0, Y1, … , YN-1), message to hash, after padding 
// Each Yi is a 32-bit word and N is a multiple of 16 
MD5(M) 
 // initialize (A, B, C, D) = IV 
 (A, B, C, D) = (0x67452301, 0xefcdab89, 0x98badcfe, 0x10325476) 
 for i = 0 to N/16 – 1 
  // Copy block i in into X 
  Xj = Y16i +j, for j = 0 to 15 
  // Copy  X to W 
  Wj = Xσ(j), for j = 0 to 63 
  // initialize Q 
  (Q-4, Q-3, Q-2, Q-1) = (A, B, C, D) 
  //Round 0, 1, 2, and 3 
  Round0(Q, W) 
  Round1(Q, W) 
  Round2(Q, W) 
  Round3(Q, W) 
  //Each addition is modulo 2
32 
  (A, B, C, D) = (Q60 + Q-4, Q63 + Q-1, Q62 + Q-2, Q61 + Q-3) 
 next i 
 return A, B, C, D 
end MD5 
MD5 Algorithm (Stamp and Low, 2007:226) 
 
 
HMAC 
The equation for calculating the MAC using HMAC is as follows: 
MAC(text) = HMAC(K, text) = H[(K0     opad)||H(K0     ipad)||text)) (1) 
where text is the input value, K0 is the key after any necessary preprocessing, opad is the 
byte 0x5c repeated B times, and ipad  is the byte 0x36 repeated B times, where B is the 
block size (NIST, 2002).  The table below describes the HMAC algorithm in detail. 
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The HMAC Algorithm 
STEPS Step-By-Step Description 
Step 1 If the length of K = B: set K0 = K.  Go to step 4 
Step 2 If the length of K > B: hash K to obtain an L byte string, then append (B-L) 
zeros to create a B-byte string K0 (K0 = H(K)||00…00).  Go to step 4 
Step 3 If the length of K < B:  append zeros to the end of K to create a B-byte string 
K0 (K0 = K||00…00) 
Step 4 Exclusive-Or K0 with ipad to produce a B-byte string: K0       ipad 
Step 5 Append the stream of data „text‟ to the string resulting from step 4:  
K0         ipad)||text 
Step 6 Apply H to the stream generated in step 5: H((K0         ipad)||text) 
Step 7 Exclusive-Or K0 with opad: K0       opad 
Step 8 Append the result from step 6 to step 7:  K0       opad|| H((K0         ipad)||text) 
Step 9 Apply H to the result from step 8: H(K0       opad|| H((K0         ipad)||text)) 
Step 10 Select the leftmost t bytes of the result of step 9 as the MAC 
Variables B – Block size (in bytes) of the approved Hash function 
H – an approved Hash function 
ipad – Inner pad; the byte x‟36‟ repeated B times 
K – shared secret key 
K0 – key K after an preprocessing to form a B byte key 
L – Block size (in bytes) of the output for the approved hash 
opad – Outer pad; the byte x‟5c‟ repeated B times 
t  - The number of bytes of MAC 
|| - concatenation 
      - Exclusive-Or operation 
(NIST, 2002) 
 
Diffie-Hellman Algorithm 
 Diffie-Hellman (DH) and RSA are two of the most common public key 
algorithms used today.  DH was the first public key algorithm created by the same men 
who first suggested the idea of a public key cryptosystem.  This algorithm provides key 
establishment through a simple key agreement method.  DH is based upon the difficulty 
of computing discrete logarithms, and the resulting key is at least 1024-bit long.  For 
more information about the DH algorithm refer to (Rescorla, 1999). 
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RSA Algorithm and PKCS #1 Encoding 
The most successful implementation of a public key cryptosystem is with the use 
of the RSA algorithm (Trappe and others, 2006:164).  This algorithm was published in 
1978 and is named after its creators Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman (Adams 
and Lloyd, 2003:17).  The security of RSA is based upon the mathematical difficulty of 
factoring integers into two large primes.  The figure below illustrates the RSA algorithm, 
from key generation to encryption and decryption.  A public key contains both the 
resulting modulus, which must be at least 1024 bits in length, and the encryption 
exponent.   
 
 
The RSA Algorithm 
1. Bob chooses secure prime p and q and computes n = pq 
2. Bob chooses e with gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1))=1 
3. Bob computes d with de ≡ 1(mod(p-1)(q-)) 
4. Bob makes n and e public, keep p, q, d secret 
5. Alice encrypts m as c ≡ m
e
(mod n) and sends c to Bob 
6. Bob decrypts by computing m ≡ c
d
(mod n) 
RSA Algorithm (Trappe and others, 2006:165) 
 
 
 
 When encrypting with RSA, the data is formatted with the Public-Key 
Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1.  Version 1.5 of PKCS #1 describes a four-step 
process to encryption.  The first step is called the Encryption-Block Formatting.  In this 
phase data is formatted as follows: 
 EB = 00 || BT || PS || 00 || D (2) 
where EB is the resulting encryption block with the length equal to the that of the 
modulus, BT is the block type, PS is a padding string, and D is the data.  The block type 
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lets the entity decrypting the data know how the block was formatted.  Three block types 
are available; 00, 01, and 02, where the first two are used for private key encryption and 
last one is used for public key encryption. 
 The content of the padding string varies based upon the block type, and the length 
of the padding string depends on the modulus and data lengths.  For the content, if BT = 
00 then each byte in the padding string is equal to 00, if BT = 01 each byte equals FF, and 
if BT = 02 then the bytes are randomly generated, nonzero values.  The padding string 
helps the decrypting end in parsing the string.  The entire encryption block must equal the 
length of the modulus in bytes.  Thus the length of the padding string is equal to the 
length of the modulus minus the length of the data minus three for the block type and the 
two 0x00 bytes in the heading.  A security condition also states that the length of PS must 
be at least 8 bytes.  Therefore the length of the data is constrained to the length of the 
modulus minus 11 in order t0 accommodate this condition and the rest of the bytes in the 
heading (Kaliski, 1998). 
 The last three steps of the RSA encryption are fairly straightforward.  First, the 
encryption block is converted from a byte string to an integer.  Next, that integer is used 
in the RSA algorithm along with the appropriate modulus and exponent values to create a 
ciphertext.  The resulting ciphertext is an integer value, and for the final step, it is 
converted back into a byte string. 
 
X.509 Certificates 
The X.509 certificate has three formats and Figure 2 shows the certificate 
structure for the Version 3 certificate.  The Version is the first field, indicating which of 
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the three formats the certificate is following.  The Serial Number comes next.  Each 
certificate signed by the CA receives a unique serial number, which helps in managing all 
of the certificates in the PKI.  The Signature field identifies the algorithm used to create 
the digital signature in the certificate.  The Issuer contains identifying information about 
the entity that signed and issued the certificate.  This information can include the 
organization name, the organizational unit name, and even the country name where the 
entity is located.  The Validity of the certificate is a field containing two timestamps.  
These timestamps indicate a window of time that the certificate is valid for. 
The Subject contains the identifying information about the owner of the 
certificate.  Like the Issuer information, the Subject information can include the 
organizational unit name, the organization name, and the country name.  The Subject 
Public Key information identifies the algorithm and the public key that is used with it.  
The Subject Unique ID is a field that may optionally be used in Versions 2 and 3 
certificates only.  This unique value is attached to the subject to help identify any reuse of 
a subject name over time. 
Extensions can only appear in Version 3 certificates.  Extensions “provide 
methods for associating additional attributes with users or public keys and for managing 
the certification hierarchy” (Housley and others, 1999:24).  Each extension can be 
marked as critical or noncritical.  A critical extension must be processed, and when that is 
not possible or the extension is not recognized, the certificate must be rejected.  For 
noncritical extensions, an entity must try to process it, but upon failure the extension can 
be ignored.  Many optional extension are defined in (Housley and others, 1999), ten of 
which are described here.   
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The Authority Key Identifier is a pointer to the public key that is needed to 
authenticate the digital signature of the certificate.  The Subject Key Identifier is a unique 
value attached to a certificate.  If one certificate is used to sign other certificates, the 
value of the Subject Key Identifier in the first certificate becomes the Authority Key 
Identifier in the new certificates. 
The Key Usage extension is a bit string that identifies the allowed usage or 
purpose of the certificate.  The nine functions identified in the Key Usage are as follows:  
Digital Signature, Non-repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment, Key 
Agreement, Certificate Signature, CRL Signature, Encipher Only, and Decipher Only.  
The Extended Key Usage “indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public 
key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic purposes indicated in the Key 
Usage extensions” (Cooper and others, 2008:44). 
 The CRL Distribution Points define locations for the CRLs.  This extension can 
list a single value or a number of general names, each of which describes “a different 
mechanism to obtain the same CRL” (Cooper and others, 2008).  If this extension 
contains a single value, then that value is a fragment that, when appended to the CRL 
Issuer name as found in the extension, gives the name of the distribution point.  If 
multiple values are listed, they can either be a directory name or a Uniform Resource 
Identifier (URI).  The directory name specifies the most current CRL and the URI is a 
pointer that CRL. 
 The Certificate Policies contains guidelines for the acceptable use of the 
certificate.  These policies give a “high-level statement of requirements and restrictions 
with the intended use of the certificates issued under that policy” (Adams and Lloyd, 
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2003:83).  This extension allows for applications with specific requirements to easily 
confirm if a presented certificate is compliant or not.  Certificate Policies allow for easier 
interoperability between applications. 
 The Subject Alternative Name and Issuer Alternative Name let other names or 
information be bound to the Subject and Issuer respectively.  These other identifiers can 
include an email address, a DNS name, an IP address, or a URI (Cooper and others, 
2008).  The Subject Directory Attributes is an extension that also adds to the certificate 
information about the Subject, such as nationality.  The final extension is the Basic 
Constraints, which is used to specify whether the certificate is that of the CA or not.  The 
Basic Constraints also specifies how many certificates can follow the CA certificate in 
the hierarchy chain. 
 
IP Header Format 
    0                   1                   2                   3    
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1  
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |  Time to Live |    Protocol   |         Header Checksum       | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                       Source Address                          | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Destination Address                        | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Options                    |    Padding    | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
 
 Internet Datagram Header        (Internet Protocol, 1981) 
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UDP 
UDP is considered to be connectionless, which means that it sends data without 
knowing if the receiving end is prepared for it.  UDP does allow for fast transmission of 
data.  This makes the protocol ideal for applications such as Voice Over IP (VoIP) where 
data needs to be transferred quickly and a dropped packet here and there does not disrupt 
the application. 
 
TCP 
The first of which is Basic Data Transfer.  This function defines and executes how 
data is packaged, sent, and received.  This description includes how data is packaged into 
segments, how many bytes to use per segment, and also when to send the data.  On the 
receiving side, the application is guaranteed byte stream service, which means that the 
data is delivered in order. 
 TCP gives Reliability to the data transfer across the network.  The protocol is 
designed to detect when data has been damaged in transit, received out of order, received 
more than once, or not received at all.  TCP uses sequence numbers in each segment to 
handle out of order or duplicated segments, a checksum as verification that the data has 
not been corrupted in transit, and acknowledgements to mitigate lost data. 
 Flow Control lets TCP manage how much data to send across the network.  The 
transmission window specifies how much data the receiving end can accept and buffer at 
one time.  The transmission window tells the sending node how much data it can send 
before another acknowledgment message is received.  The protocol allows this window 
to fluctuate in size depending on current network variables.   
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 Mulitplexing or Multiprocessing lets a node process data from multiple sources at 
once.  TCP defines port numbers for both the source and the destination of the data.  
These port numbers are how multiple connections can occur over a single socket.  Each 
connection is uniquely identified based upon the two port numbers and the two IP 
addresses from both the TCP segment and the IP datagram. 
A TCP header encapsulates the application data, when it is packaged for the 
network.  The format for the TCP header is seen in the figure below.  A standard header 
for TCP is 20 bytes long (at a minimum), but can be longer if TCP Options are present.  
The first two elements in the TCP header are the Source and Destination Ports, each 2 
bytes long.  The port numbers are followed by the Sequence and the Acknowledgement 
(ACK) Numbers.  These values both have a length of 4 bytes.  The sequence number is 
arbitrarily chosen to begin with and is incremented for each byte of data that is sent.  The 
ACK number identifies the last byte of data that was received and is set to the next 
expected sequence number from the other entity. 
 The Data Offset is a byte long and identifies the number of words in the TCP 
header, where a word is equal to 2 bytes.  The data offset acts as a pointer indicating the 
beginning of the segment data.  The Reserved Field is left open for any future 
functionality that may need to be added to the TCP header. 
 The Flags come next and total a byte in length.  Each bit signifies a different flag 
and each flag signifies a different functionality.  Six flags were originally defined with 
two more added later to the protocol.  Since the two new flags are not relevant to this 
study, they are not discussed here.  The six original flags are URG, ACK, PSH, RST, 
SYN, and FIN.  URG stands for Urgent and means that the segment is considered urgent  
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    0                   1                   2                   3    
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1  
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |          Source Port          |       Destination Port        | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                        Sequence Number                        | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Acknowledgment Number                      | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |  Data |           |U|A|P|R|S|F|                               | 
   | Offset| Reserved  |R|C|S|S|Y|I|            Window             | 
   |       |           |G|K|H|T|N|N|                               | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |           Checksum            |         Urgent Pointer        | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Options                    |    Padding    | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                             data                              | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
 
TCP Header Format  (Transmission Control Protocol, 1981) 
 
 
 
and should be processed immediately.  ACK means Acknowledgment and signifies that 
the ACK number in the segment header is valid.  The ACK bit should be set in every 
segment of the connection except for the initial, first message.  The PSH flag stands for 
Push.  This flag indicates that the segment data should be pushed up to the application as 
soon as possible.  The RST, or Reset, flag is used to reset the current TCP connection.  
Usually this flag is set in response to a segment being sent to the wrong port or when the 
entity needs to terminate the connection.  SYN stands for Synchronize.  This flag 
indicates that a TCP connection is being established and it should only be seen in the first 
message sent by each entity.  The final flag FIN, or Finish, signifies that the sender has 
no more data to send and that the connection should be closed.  The preferred method for 
terminating a connection is to use the FIN flag instead of the RST flag. 
 The Window field is 2 bytes long and indicates the number of bytes that the 
sender is willing to accept at one time.  The Checksum is a 2 byte field that is used to 
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determine if the data has been change or corrupted in transit.  The Urgent Pointer 
indicates the Sequence Number of the last byte to be considered part of the urgent data 
when the URG flag is set.  This field is 2 bytes in longs. 
 The Options field was created to allow for any extensions or modifications to 
TCP.  Instead of having to completely upgrade the protocol for every adjustment, one 
could add to the existing protocol using the options.  This field is always located after the 
required part of the header and before the segment data.  The length of the options can 
vary depending on which options are used.  The format of every option starts with a bytes 
that indicates its kind.  Only two options are available the just consist of the kind.  For the 
other multi-byte options, the length follows the kind.  The length is only 1 byte long and 
includes both the kind and the length in its count.  Up to 58 bytes are available for the 
options.   
 The End-of-Option List (EOL) is the first option kind, which has a value of 0x00.  
This option indicates that there are no more options left in the list.  The EOL is not used 
if the options end in a 4 byte boundary.  The other single byte option is the No-Operation 
(NOP).  The value of this option is 0x01 and means that the node should do nothing.  The 
NOP is usually used as a separator or placeholder in the list of Options. 
 The Window Scale Option (WSOPT) adds higher performance capabilities to 
TCP.  This option allows the two entities to negotiate a window scaling factor, which 
means that the entities can change the default maximum buffer size.  This option has 3 
bytes; the kind, the length, and the scaling factor.  The scaling factor is applied to the 
sending entity‟s receive window.  This option must be negotiated in the SYN segments, 
and both sides must send this option in order for it to apply to the current connection. 
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 The Timestamp Option was also created to add higher performance capabilities to 
TCP.  This option lets each entity check the other‟s clock, as well as ensuring that old 
segments are not acknowledged.  The format for this option is as follows: the kind, 
length, a 4 byte TSvalue, and a 4 byte TS echo (TSecr) value.  The TSvalue is the current 
timestamp of the sending entity.  The TSecr value is the timestamp value the other entity 
sent in the last received segment.  This option must be sent in the SYN messages or it is 
ignored in the rest of the connection.  Also, if the Timestamp option is used, it must 
always be sent and echoed from both sides. 
 The Selective Acknowledgement (SACK) Option optimizes the 
acknowledgement process of the data.  As originally described in the TCP standard, the 
ACK numbers indicate all of the bytes in sequence, up to the ACK number, that has been 
received.  The advantage of this method is that every segment does not need an 
acknowledgment.  The disadvantage is when a segment is lost, for any segment sent after 
the lost one must also be resent.  To optimize this process, the SACK Option is used to 
specify ranges of data that has been received.  Thus if one segment is lost, only that 
segment is resent because the host can still acknowledge all the data received after that 
lost segment.  Two different option formats are used for the SACK Option.  The first is 
the SACK-Permitted, which is 2 bytes long.  This option indicates that the entity can 
perform Selective Acknowledgements.  Both entities must send this option in the SYN 
messages before it can be used.  The second option is the SACK itself, which consists of 
the kind, the length, and up to four distinct blocks of data.  Each block contains two 
values; the first for the first byte received and the second for the last byte received in the 
block. 
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 The Padding field in the TCP header is only used if the TCP header length does 
not end in a 4 byte boundary.  This uneven length can only occur when TCP Options are 
present in the header.  Finally, after the all of header information comes the application 
data. 
 
MAC calculation for TLS Protocol 
Before encryption, a MAC of the data in its current form is calculated and added 
to the data.  For stream ciphers, the MAC is just appended to the end of the data before it 
is encrypted.  For block ciphers, the length of the data block must be a multiple of eight 
before it can be encrypted.  Thus the data block is as follows: 
 data || MAC || paddingLen || paddingStr (3) 
where paddingLen is a byte indicating the length of paddingStr, and each byte in 
paddingStr is equal to paddingLen.  If the cipher algorithm is null, then the data remains 
unencrypted and the MAC size is zero. 
 
Difference of PRF between TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 
For TLS Versions 1.0 and 1.1, the HMAC_hash used is a combination of both 
MD5 and SHA-1.  Thus the PRF for these versions is calculated as follows: 
PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5 (S1, label || seed)  XOR  
 P_SHA1(S2, label || seed) (4) 
where S1 and S2 are part of secret.  If the length of the secret is even, then S1 || S2 = 
secret where the S1 and S2 are of equal length.  If the length of secret is odd, then S1 || 
S2[1:] = secret, where S1 and S2 are of equal length and the last byte of S1 is also the first 
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byte of S2.  For Version 1.2, the PRF function just uses SHA256 as the basis of the 
HMAC.  The PRF for this version is calculated as follows: 
 PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_SHA256 (secret, label || seed) (9) 
For all versions of the PRF, the P_hash function is iterated as many times needed 
to produce the number of bytes required.  For example, suppose 100 bytes of data is 
needed as an output from the PRF.  For the first version, the P_MD5 hash is run 7 times 
and the last 12 bytes are dropped to get 100 bytes.  The P_SHA1 hash is run 5 times to 
get an even 100 bytes.  These two values are then XORed to get the final PRF result.  For 
the second version, P_SHA256 is run 4 times and the last 28 bytes is dropped to get the 
final result of 100 bytes.   
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Appendix C:  Scapy 
 
 
In order for the MitM machine to accomplish the above attack, some tool is 
needed that gives the MitM the flexibility he needs to perform each step.  For this 
experiment Scapy is chosen to be the tool running on the MitM machine.  Scapy is an 
open source Python program that provides a myriad of capabilities by enabling “users to 
send, sniff and dissect, and forge network packets” (Biondi, 2010:3).  This program 
provides many benefits to this experiment, combining many capabilities into one tool. 
First the MitM needs to be able to sniff packets off the network and quickly grab 
the vital information that is needed from the packet.  Scapy‟s sniffing capability not only 
allows a user to sniff and store all packets on the network, but also lets a user sniff for 
particular packets based on protocol fields.  For example, a user can ask Scapy to filter 
and store all packets from a particular IP address and with a specific destination port 
number.  This capability allows the MitM to pick up just the TLS packets that it needs 
and not have to sort through a long list to find them. 
Scapy inherently contains many common protocols and can quickly parse 
captured packets into each protocol layer and their subsequent fields.  If a protocol that a 
user needs does not already exist in Scapy, it can easily be coded and added to the 
program.  A captured packet can then displayed as a whole showing all protocols used 
and their fields, or each individual field can be accessed and stored.  This feature allows 
the MitM to store all the TLS Handshake messages to be used later in the Finished hash. 
This feature also lets the MitM store individual pieces of information, such as the 
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clientRandom value from the ClientHello packet, which is used in generating the session 
keys. 
Not only does the MitM need to sniff and have access to the data in the packets, 
he also needs to be able to generate packets from scratch to send to the server and the 
client.  Scapy is a very handy packet generator that allows a user to create packets 
however she wishes, even if the packet does not comply with protocol standards.  Also, 
many of the fields for the protocols contain default values or automatically fill in values.  
For example, the IP Header Checksum is automatically calculated and entered into the 
field by Scapy when the packet is sent.  Yet, if the user wishes to put her own value in as 
the header checksum she can do so.  This capability allows the MitM to quickly craft 
packets, adding or changing only the data that is required and not having to worrying 
about creating the entire packet. 
Scapy also has a nice send and receive functionality.  Users can create and send 
packets without any care for the responses.  Scapy can also send packets created by the 
user and receive and store the responses.  The user can tell Scapy to store all the 
responses or just the first response received.  The send and receive functionality benefits 
the MitM greatly.  For example, the MitM only has to forward the sniffed ClientHello 
packet to the server and tell Scapy to receive the first response.  Automatically the 
server‟s reply is grabbed and stored by Scapy without the MitM needing to sniff the 
network to find the packet. 
  
 
 
 
Appendix D: Raw Data Interpretation 
 
 
 The raw data for this experiment was collected using Wireshark.  Each packet 
capture was exported into a Comma Separate Values summary so that it can be opened 
into an Excel spreadsheet.  The Excel sheet indicates the start of each TLS Handshake 
and end packet that the data result was taken from.  All information related to the data 
collection, including the Wireshark captures and the Excel spreadsheets, 
 as well as the script used to run and collect the data can be found in the companion CD.  
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